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IBN GABIROL'S POEM BEGINNING "AHAVTIKHA . . ."*

FREDERICK P. BARGEBUHR

That Man's love for his son—past limitation, Genesis 22:2
with all his heart, all soul, all motivation— Deut. 6:5

I gave to thee, rejoicing in thy questing
for cause and way of God-begot creation.

This matter, true, is very deep and goes far;
who could unveil and grasp its implication?

I overheard a word I mean to tell thee;
to find its meaning, use thy divination:

In Whose hand lies the universe, said sages,
that Universe holds all its explanation. Prov. 16:4

The yet unformed, as lover for his lov'd one,
to Him it yearns, desiring His formation.

Perhaps this did the Prophets mean in saying:
He did create it for His exaltation. Isaiah 43:7

A word I have replied to thee—O do thou,
by thine example, give its confirmation.

THINKING OF IBN GABIROL, we may regret the fact that this deep thinker, this faithful harmonizer of ancient thought and monotheistic piety, was born into an age in which he remained an isolated figure. But we must ask: Where could he have found his equals, men with an orientation like his? What time and place would have given him an adequate background?

Let us, for the moment, forget obstacles of time, and even the national and religious barriers of his age, and try to place him. Would the court of Emperor Frederick II in Sicily, a century later, have been the proper setting for him? Here far-reaching questions were raised, translations of Greek and Arabic authors undertaken, and philosophical and religious problems, closely related to Ibn Gabirol's own, were studied in a

* With the support of a grant from The American Philosophical Society.

liberal spirit.[1] But here, as wherever the dominant religion was also the dominant source of secular power, the opponents of such power seem doomed to develop disbelief and are forced into the skeptical camp. Ibn Gabirol was a believer, and the aim of his thinking was the same as that of his hymns: to create new paths by which he could approach his God; to wind his garlands of devotion, of mystical exaltation, cosmological systems, and logical constructions. The Sicily of Frederick II would not have been the place for him.

Would he have been contented at the art-loving court of an Islamic prince, such as that of his contemporary, Hakam II, in Cordova, with its rich academies and libraries? Here the astonishing emancipatory spirit of the eleventh century in Spain was at its height. To say it in the words of Henri Pérès:

> L'Espagne du XI^e siècle a eu le privilège de connaître cet aspect nouveau de la pensée musulmane. Ses lettrés, en continuant inconsciemment la tradition ibéro-romaine sur laquelle s'était greffée la culture arabo-musulmane, sont arrivés, par suite de la liberté dont ils jouissaient, à faire revivre la pensée antique en lui donnant cette teinte spéciale qui est due à l'influence judéo-chrétienne.[2]

At Hakam II's court, poets and thinkers found a free haven for their work, but its secular splendor would not have attracted Ibn Gabirol. He scorned "Lady World" for her vain temptations. He felt he had no right to anticipate the messianic emancipation of his nation. Instead, he had to keep his life suspended in expectation of the "end" and its salvation, rather than return to a life of luxury, striving for worldly success with an all-too-ephemeral ambition. Moreover, what he called his "shortcoming," or his feeling of "guilt," would have kept him apart from the country festivals, with their music and lavish meals in the style of this period, in cool places by artificial fountains. The scars left on his heart by his lonely adolescent struggle (his windmills were bitter reality for him) still pained him and threatened to open when they were touched.

Where could he have found harmony with his contemporaries? In actuality, Ibn Gabirol found the "court" of a Jewish *wesir,* Samuel ha-Nagid. But even there, among the Hebrew poets and thinkers assembled in the academy, he remained an alien. One might think that

1. Cf. Munk: *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (Paris, 1859), p. 145.
2. *La poésie andalouse, en arabe classique, au XI^e siècle* (Paris, 1937), p. 39.

here, in the presence of this deeply learned, verse-making man, Ibn Gabirol could have developed his genius. If Samuel had been merely a secular statesman, merely a Karl August of Weimar, or a specialist in one field, this might have been possible, but Ibn Gabirol was apparently put in the position of a court poet or, if we may say so, an Eckermann. He felt that he was plagiarized and his light hidden under a bushel. In spite, or perhaps because, of Ibn Gabirol's enthusiastic veneration for Samuel ha-Nagid, especially at the beginning of his stay, this court was too narrow a shell; a dream of a realm in which he himself would be the only king was never entirely forgotten. In addition, his expectations from every new person who entered his life were perhaps too limitless. Did Michelangelo, with whom he shares many characteristics, live a contented life in the Renaissance at its climax? Apparently we must grant that, for a man with such inner disharmony, no outer conditions could solve his problem.

Could Ibn Gabirol have lived in our time? I quote Gilbert Murray (slightly out of context): "If Julian and Sallustius, Gregory and John Chrysostom, were to rise again and see the world as it now is, they would probably feel their personal differences melt away in comparison with the vast difference between their world and this."[3] In his youth, hatred had caused Ibn Gabirol to flee from Zaragosa, and we hear of his being denounced by his co-religionists to the Islamic authorities for having made and been served by a female "Golem." He may have used an anatomical model for his medical studies (if this report is based upon facts) or have had a human microcosm which, as the report says, could be easily dismantled. At any rate, this suspicion would have been indicative of the tension between Ibn Gabirol and his community; it would have provided a welcome excuse for the interference in the self-centered existence of this high-strung anchorite.

In his loneliness and frailty, as in many other respects, Ibn Gabirol can be compared to Spinoza, although rationalism led the latter away from a belief in a personal God.

> Buried, but not in the wilderness—in my own house, my coffin;
> Grieved, without mother, with no father, young, lonely, and poor;
> Forlorn, without brother, and no guest except my quest. . . .

Thus Ibn Gabirol complained at an early age. And still his faith taught

3. *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (London, 1943), p. 196.

him to expect his hour at any minute; even after endless disappointments and delusions he never lost his belief in men and his own mission to teach and lead them. Further facts about the life of this man are not known to us, except that it ended after about forty-eight or forty-nine years in Valencia. He "belongs" nowhere in this world but to history: "Ses ailes de géant l'empêchent de marcher" (Baudelaire, "L'Albatros").

In the work of Ibn Gabirol, the poem beginning *Ahavtikha* represents a climax; it stands by itself apart from the two clear-cut groups of secular poems and religious-philosophical poems, and synthesizes them. But even among all the documents of this period, which Heinrich Heine calls the "Gothic Night" in his verses on Ibn Gabirol, this poem deserves admiration. In its eight couplets, a unity of teaching, life, and poetry is achieved which is the expression of a unique and significant person, and also of an important phase in that development of the human spirit which gave to adherents of the monotheistic belief freedom of the personality, and importance before God as only the ancients knew it.

The poem may appear veiled at first glance. Its reserved expression is not only deference to, or an allowance for, the contemporary authorities; it is characteristic of the language of the enlightened, who can and must limit themselves to suggestions and hints, because they know they will be understood by persons of their own kind in spite, or even because, of their veiled language. Thus they speak only for these persons. If it seems astonishing that this unofficial *poeta laureatus synagogae* should challenge the ruling religious thought of his time, I might mention his being called "a Greek" by his hostile community, as he reports in his *Shir teluna,* and the tradition of the golem accusation mentioned above. Finally, the extent to which his philosophical work became the subject of attacks and soon entirely apocryphal among his co-religionists, proves this.

The poem is a powerful affirmation. There is nothing in it of an attitude of denial towards the worldly life which he expressed elsewhere, or of the pessimism of an ill-fated man. Here, the thought is not compressed into the limits of his own belief. Although Ibn Gabirol uses the words of Holy Writ to authorize Hellenistic philosophy, the teaching of this poem is a universal one, as is that of his magnum opus, the *Fons Vitae,* which includes no biblical quotations. This is the philosophical language of the Mediterranean world, a language which goes

beyond the borders of nations and religions, following the traditions of the ancients. The poem might, in one respect, be called the *summa theologica* of that *Fons Vitae* (*Meqor Hayyim,* in Hebrew) whose early Latin translation has fortunately been preserved, though the Arabic original is lost.[4] It is, at least, the best introduction to the *Fons Vitae.* Yet, to say this would not be enough, because here philosophy becomes religious and secular action. To put it briefly: Ibn Gabirol teaches that longing for knowledge is more than knowledge, and that "theology" has to be lived.

This document is unique because of its threefold aspect: first, it is religious and mystical, yet its language bears no resemblance to the stammering hyperbolic expression of a man overwhelmed by a personal mystical experience—the wording could not be more formal and general. Second, it remains a poem in spite of the strict structure of its thesis. Finally, although it is a poem born in an inspired moment, it imposes an obligation of lasting significance. The poem ranks among those in which the unity between wisdom and vitality which Hölderlin praises in his poem, "Socrates and Alcibiades," is achieved: "Wer das Tiefste gedacht liebt das Lebendigste."

To examine the content of the poem: in a letter a disciple has asked the philosopher Ibn Gabirol about the reason for, and the comprehensibility of, God's creation of the world which he begot. The disciple asks for an explanation of the old problem: why did God create the world? For, if the divine is consummate in itself, what good can the creation and the existence of the world be to it? What is the relation between God and world? How can the philosophical conception of a consummate and transcendent God tally with the Jewish tradition of a creator God, who carried out his work in time or before time? If the divinity created the world "in the beginning," as the book of Genesis teaches, was not that a sign that the divinity must have been incomplete before and subjected to a tension which was pressing towards the crea-

4. This *Fons Vitae* was highly authoritative (in its Latin version) among the scholastics of the thirteenth century, mainly for William of Auvergne and Duns Scotus. However, the author, mostly called Avicebron, was no longer identified with the Hebrew poet. The authority of this book was mainly attacked by Albertus Magnus (although he ascribed it to Plato himself), and by Thomas Aquinas in his *De Ente et Essentia* (wishing to refute the theories of the Augustinians based upon the *Fons Vitae*). Cf. John Goheen: *The Problem of Matter and Form in the De Ente et Essentia of Thomas Aquinas* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940) pp. 3 ff.

tion? This would involve a still more burning question: if the divinity is absolute, transcendental, and not personal, what is the direction of our religious love, our obedient veneration through prayers and charitable deeds?

The simple insistence and the inner need of the questioner touch the master, because of their nearness to his own quest and personality. Ardent natures, said Renan, are always inclined to see a significance in every occurence, for them events are symbols. A decision which the master must make for himself, as well as for the questioning disciple, has been demanded. In his passionate reply, Ibn Gabirol calls the apparently younger pupil his (spiritual) son and addresses him with a phrase forged from the highest biblical reference to religious and paternal love:

> That Man's love for his son—past limitation
> with all his heart, all soul, all motivation—
> I gave to thee . . .

The phrase is a combination of (1) the words with which God addresses Abraham as he demands the sacrifice of his only son: "Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac whom thou lovest," and (2) that other dictum which is the highest commandment of the Jewish Faith, the "Hear, O Israel: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart and with all thy soul and with all thy might." The Hebrew wording of the poem implies both interpretations: (1) "I have loved you with the love of a man for his only one," and (2) "with the love of The Man" (i.e., the "Man of God," referring to Abraham), "for his only son" (Isaac).

A great risk in relation to both God and man has been taken in applying these religious formulae to a secular address. (Only later Hebrew poets, such as al-Harizi or Immanuel ha-Romi, were less scrupulous in the use of biblical quotations. These poets often weakly imitated Ibn Gabirol's poems, even these lines.) The first reply comes from the heart of the master, not his mind; instead of a logical answer, he replies by offering his own self to the questioner. If these first words of love from a theologian and religious poet are not to become a blasphemy, the master has to live his faith, to make himself its symbol. The theological question, however, must be answered in terms of impersonal reason. The philosopher is confronted with an ultimate challenge, and he bears the responsibility for the truth of his faith in God, for God's creation and the position of the believer in it, and for his disciple. His concep-

tion of the universe stands and falls by the right reply. But neither he nor anyone else can give the final answer; he is only able to show the direction in which it is blessed to search. He can show the path to the solution, but the solution itself must be won; it can not merely be taken.

Ibn Gabirol, therefore, presents two statements as opposites and advises that the solution be sought in the field of tension between them. The first is a statement of Greek "sages" that the world exists for the Creator, and its entity is only to be understood through God, whom he calls, "That Universe in Whose hand the universe lies." The cosmic harmony is the proof that the universe is begotten and maintained by one sole power and stands in a permanent relation to its creator. The Hebrew wording has its support in Proverbs 16:4 (similarly Plato, in his second letter, speaks of a king in whose hands everything remains). However, the world is not finally created; it is not static and crystallized according to Neoplatonic doctrine, but eternally revolves around the creative divine centre, losing and gaining distance. Formless matter of which Plato speaks in *Timaeus* 50-52 (here called, in Aristotle's phrase, ἐγγὺς οὐδία πως, the "not-yet-quite-existing" or the "only-virtually-existing," which is the substratum, the matrix of all formation) is driven by its longing to be united with the paternal form, to come near the factual existence-giving finger of the Creator. (Adam's gesture, in the fresco of the Sistine Chapel, reflects these Neoplatonic doctrines which Ibn Gabirol interpreted in his *Fons Vitae*). We find the following passages in this book:

> Disciple: What proves that the movement of Matter and the other substances is appetency and love?
>
> Master: Since the aim of appetency and love is nothing but a striving towards connection with the beloved and towards union with it, and since matter seeks to be connected with form, then, necessarily, the movement of matter occurs because of the desire which it has towards the form (ed. Cl. Baeumker, v. 32).

And:

> Master: Because matter is nearest to the One-ness and One-ness flows into it, therefore, the one-ness compels matter . . . to move towards it so that it may receive perfection from it; and when matter receives form it becomes knowing and perfect through it and nothing else remains to be acquired (v. 33).

Also:

> Master: Matter has no existence without form, since existence flows out of the

> form; therefore matter moved towards receiving the form, so to say, in order to proceed from the pain of inexistence to the delectation of being (v. 29).

The universe is moved by such yearning. The universal matter, the passive principle supporting whatever is formed within the universe—the spheres as well as the angels and every creature—yearns towards the acceptance of form. Everything created is dual, Matter and Form; only God is One. By such yearning the universe is moved. Just as for Dante, 250 years later, it is a loving power, "L'amor che muove il sole e l'altre stelle"; this longing of matter can be compared to one state only, the longing of the lover for the Beloved, and his anxiety for reunion with the giver of his completion and all-inspiring bliss.

It is hardly necessary to say that the idea of a cosmic love moving the universe found its philosophic interpretation in Parmenides and in Aristotle's *Physics* (I.9), and that love was so significantly defined by Plato in his *Symposium* as a universal power, with the discovery that the lover is the bearer of the divine power even more than the venerated idol of our passion, which the Greeks were only too willing to call divine, and may be only the mediator and messenger of this power. Plato's Eros is also the stimulus to men's great deeds and their philosophy, their "yearning for wisdom." Neoplatonism, which was well known to the Arab philosophers of Ibn Gabirol's time (they had in the so called "Theology of Aristotle" the main doctrines of Plotinus' last three *Enneads;* also al-Kindi's lost treatise on love may have disseminated these ideas which Ibn Sina later expounds in his treatise) offered an answer for the monotheistic believer and mystic, to his ardent wish to be united with the eternal source of all life and truth. Already Philo, the first great harmonizer of Greek and Judaic lore, makes Moses the prototype of a passionate seeker of truth. He lets God advise Moses, who desires to have the knowledge of God's essence, to continue to have "a constant and profound longing for wisdom, which fills its scholars and disciples with glorious and most beautiful doctrines."[5]

So universal a meaning has love in this Neoplatonic philosophy: a yearning (to be compared with and understood by human love) to be formed by the creator fills all the formless matter in the universe.[6]

5. *From De specialibus legibus,* quoted in H. A. Wolfson, *Philo,* II.148.

6. According to Plotinus (*Enneads* III.6.9 in S. MacKenna's translation) matter "has no title to the name of Being. It will be more plausibly called a non-being . . . it is no more than the image and phantasm of mass, a bare aspiration towards sub-

But how is the pagan and secular wisdom of these "sages" to be applied in the sublime quest? Ibn Gabirol supports their word by a biblical word which is the other half of an equation. He says that perhaps this is what the prophets mean when they say: "The whole earth is full of His glory" (Isaiah 6:3) and "Everyone that is called by my name: for I have erected him for my glory, I have formed him, yea I have made him" (Isaiah 43:7). By equating the two statements, that of the ancient sages and that of Isaiah, he gives to both a new interpretation which could be formulated: the world serves the creator to his glory or Honor *(kavod),* which we translated "Exaltation". What is this Honor? The original meaning, in the context of Isaiah, is the majesty of the world-monarch, his glory and homage among the creatures, which "all lands sing forth" (Psalms, 66:2), as is due the King of Kings. Here "Honor" has been removed from its relation to a worldly sovereign and (in connection with the first statement) has a far more universal meaning. The advanced philosophical conception of divinity (which was adopted and newly defined by Judaism at the time of the Alexandrian translators and philosophers) stipulates a divinity transcendent beyond time and will, absolute in itself, thinking and contemplating only itself and its own perfection. In connection with this conception of the divinity, "Honor," as already interpreted by Philo and Saadia, will have to attain new meaning.

It remains for us to discover what the poet left to be completed by his disciple, working to harmonize this "field of tension" between the heterogeneous statements. Ibn Gabirol has developed a system of allegorical interpretation of the Bible of which a very few specimens are cautiously preserved by Abraham Ibn Ezra. An interpretation of the verse quoted above (Isaiah 43:7) is among them, although no reference is made to the new meaning of "Honor" (or "Splendor," or "Glory").

stantial existance." Also: (*Enneads* II.4.12) "Matter . . . is necessary to quality and to quantity, and, therefore, to body. It is, thus, no name void of content; we know there is such a base, invisible and without bulk though it be." Already Augustine (*De Genesi ad Litteram* I, cap. 1) equalized a chaotic principle of matter (Plotinus called matter "lawless and void") with the biblical phrase referring to the state before the creation of the world "without form and void" (Genesis 1:2). Also for Ibn Gabirol primordial matter is a nothingness or the not-yet-being emanating from the Godhead; this nothingness or being-only-in-potentiality, however, is thus the powerful "opaque" principle of formability yearning to support the other principle, i.e., form, which the Divine Will gives when creating existence "in effectu" (*Fons Vitae* I. 13).

However, in one of the few passages in Ibn Gabirol's *Fons Vitae* where an allusion to a biblical conception is recognizable, he says: Matter is, as it were, the Seat of the One, and the Divine Will, the giver of Form, sits upon it.[7] Here we have, without doubt, another reminder of Ibn Gabirol's allegorical interpretation of the Bible, referring to the "Seat of Honor" in I Kings 22:19 and Isaiah 6:1. Again the too immanent, too relative significance of a comparison with a worldly monarch is replaced by a more philosophical meaning. Upon matter, as upon a throne, God's Will takes its seat. While bestowing Form upon a colorless and shapeless Matter, God's Glory becomes apparent. Already earlier interpreters had explained "the paved work" of Exodus 24:10 ("there was under his feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone, and as it were the body of heaven in his clearness"), or God's throne, according to the Aramaic Targum, as nothing else but the First Matter, white and iridescent as snow and sapphire.

The continual process of formation is nothing but God's self-unfolding. It is his loving contemplation of himself; the abundance of his creation is his own shining reflection. Divinity remains within itself, without want or need, without participation in time, because the material universe in its permanent process of creation is only God's objective subjectification. His presence in the universe, God's Honor in all its appearances, is one, namely, our subjective aspect of his self-contained being, the *methexis,* or participation, of the World in God. Divinity itself remains beyond the universe, which it "carries in its hand," or which is the reflecting pedestal beneath its feet, or its Throne. Divinity is in the universe only in so far as God's Glory fills it. But the fact that the formative matter yearns of itself to serve this purpose, to reflect God's image while being formed, and that no third power has to enforce God's creative Will (the Divine Will is only a logical hypostasis) proves that all this is a process within divinity itself. Dante taught these ideas to the Christian world, namely, that God created the universe.

> . . . perchè il suo splendore
> Potesse, risplendendo, dir: Subsisto.
> (*Paradiso* 29:15)

It remains, further, to find out what is the task and the destiny of our own matter within the universe. Are we, according to Ibn Gabirol, en-

7. *Fons Vitae,* v. 70 (cf. Munk, *op.cit.,* p. 144).

tirely passive and subject to the eternal rotation of the divine world harmony? The yearning of matter the poet said, serves God to his honor or exaltation which is God's self-unfolding. This yearning of matter was compared to human love. To which love is reference made? Love to God or love to a human person? The quotation from the Greek sages clearly indicates that it is a human person: "as lover for his lov'd one." Are we now forced to love or are we able to direct and to modify our love? Is our yearning human matter just like any matter, or is ours a specific function within the unfolding of God's Honor? What is the relation between divine and secular love?

Let us examine the lines in which love is discussed. Two loves are mentioned: one love that of the poet, "that Man's love for his son" (literally, "I loved you as there is the love of the Man towards his only one"); and the other love of the unformed matter "as lover for his lov'd one." The prefix *ke* (as) and the same particle in the form *kemo* (as) are both to be taken literally, not as the "like" or "similar to" of a comparison, but as the "just as" of an equation. The two lines correspond to each other because of their common theme, love. Here we must forget our century with its lack of metaphysics and its abundance of physics.[8] A love worthy of being a paradigm of the cosmic relation of universal matter and universal form, this all-comprising power, cannot be a vague feeling. And, indeed, for the Platonist, the power which moves us to our deepest thoughts and our best deeds is, as Goethe says, *der Allkraft Teil,* and a part of the divinity which would be nothing if it were only "pushing from outside." Consequently, is not our pure and spiritual love proved by its own power and direction to be more than temporal illusion and error? Does it not lead to perfection? Where else should God's might be more admired and felt near and purifying if not in an admirable person? The genuinely religious centuries venerated God's creative power wherever it was felt. Ibn Gabirol is not alone in these ideas. They are similar to those of Saadia and Ibn Masarra, and relate to the practices of the early German Hasidim (as expresed in the *Sefer Ha-yashar*) and the Islamic Sufis. Secular love was the legitimate parallel and part of the love to God to which we are commanded. Secular love served as a paral-

8. M. Asín Palacios, in his *Abenházam de Córdoba* (I, 61), describes "el amor mistico a la mujer . . . intensificando en las almas el calor del sentimiento religioso como natural derivación, sin duda, del instinto sexual reprimido por este mismo sentimiento religiose."

lel to the relation of Matter and Form, and the yearning of matter was the source of God's Honor. Where will this lead? No doubt, loving we are part of the divine circulation. We share our longing with all matter. However, human longing, professed and purified as a free fulfillment of a command in our deeds and belief, has the function of serving as a worthy paradigm of God's self-unfolding. The nearer our love comes to attaining divine formation, the nearer we are to the center where the first matter, the most spiritual matter, receives (as the answer to its strongest longing) the most colorful glow of God's appearance or Honor. If we open our hearts to the divine power, sublimate the matter of our soul, then it allows the most colorful reflexes to appear upon her snowy, or sapphire-clear white surface. The mysterious transcendence of the divinity itself takes place right in our souls. With this belief, Platonic as it may appear, we are near to the highest command of the Jewish faith: "Hear, O Israel: Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God with all thine heart. . . ."

We ourselves must make this interpolation, this reconciliation of the two statements, since so much remained unspoken. If we ask why the poet could not voice his thought more clearly, we find various reasons. A sublime hunger, a creative ignorance is the lot of the true philosopher. These last conclusions touch the limits of the philosopher's realm of thought, and he feels what Stefan George expressed in his *"Schweig Gedanke, Seele bete."* He dares equate the two statements, not as a final synthesis, but as a trial hypothesis, with the great teachers as support, and on the authority of the Bible. The other reason for leaving this meaning implicit is his deference to the common belief. The divinity, as presented here, called "that Universe," is so far from the personal God, the active judge and merciful ruler of our life, as conceived by traditional Judaism, that this could not be a theology for all. The mystic, aware of the enigmatic relation between God and world, fills the vacuum; while contemplating the mysteries of the universe, he immerses himself in the ocean of awe in whose depth he may see a light.

With all this in mind, we may understand a last hidden link of thought, that between the frame of our poem (couplets 1-4 and 8) i.e., the personal intent of the poem, and the teaching in the middle verses: the link between the poet's own love as professed in the beginning and the loving yearning of the universal matter which moves the universe. It might sound strange and was, therefore, overlooked by earlier in-

terpreters that this slight but passionate connection is the essence of Ibn Gabirol's address to his disciple. If we remember that Philo made Moses the prototype of man as God intended, filled with a boundless hunger for wisdom about God, here Ibn Gabirol, in his genius of heart and mind, seems to make his own disciple the cornerstone of the world order as he understands it. He lets him bear the burden of fulfilling the meaning of creation. The poet's love is an active and formative one. He wishes to appeal to his disciple: Show by your life of loving quest that we are part of God's power. Although we shall never be able to answer our gravest questions, our permanent seeking is the blissful fulfillment of, and greatest co-ordination with, the God-filled universe. Truth has to be lived in order to be won. We are commanded to love.

If one thinks that this interpolation is far-fetched, he should consider that the connection of frame and teaching does not grow out of a merely fictional mood. There is hardly a line in Ibn Gabirol's work where we do not feel his intense and responsible concentration upon it. Hebrew is his sacred tongue. Only inspiration in a blessed moment made him dare to word his love in the highest formulae of his faith, and to continue teaching that love governs the relation of matter and form in the universe. We see that the poet had been called upon as guiding philosopher. By giving way to moods and loose impressions, he would have wantonly overthrown his authority by evasive replies, and more, his own inner sincerity would have collapsed. The main statements of the reply show a strict structure of thought, as was proper in this highly important connection, and from an answerer who was (or was to become) the author of the *Fons Vitae,* a work which was of scholarly renown for quite a long period.

The formulae of our poem lack amplification and call to mind the philosophical dialogue between Teacher and Disciple of his main work. The poem is rhymed upon a limited group of philosophical terms, all of them of the heaviest weight. (The same terms appear in the poet's great religious poem, "The Kingdom's Crown," in a most significant place.) The poet does not repeat himself in these rockhewn distichs. While the first couplet asks the disciple to examine the meaning of the poet's reply by himself, the last couplet does far more. Here the disciple is asked to give (in a *varia lectio* "to acquire") a "proof" in order to "maintain" the poet's reply. The disciple must give a proof, and this means more than merely understanding the poet's intention. (That

the disciple was already seeking was admitted in the second distich.) It means that he must make his life the proof that God's honor is our pure longing towards union with knowledge and perfection, so that we become a worthy part of God's self-contemplation within the world. The teacher does not say whether his conception becomes a fact, conclusive for all. The disciple must feel the suspension, carry the burden of its responsibility, and give the creative answer to his own question, which is religious and not philosophical. We are in the realm of command. Vain questioning may lead to passive acquiescence in doubts. Ibn Gabirol's teaching is nowhere only theoretical but always ethical education. "Scientia et opere . . . coniungitur anima saeculo altiori," he teaches; for the Platonist ἐπιστήμη precedes ἀρετὴ. An enormous arc must bridge the gap between the two worlds of thought, joining Plato's Eros and Moses' "Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God." Thus the disciple is called upon to become this living link, a vessel of universal love, and God's masterpiece. Until then the equation will not be valid. If he fails, the word "falls unto the earth."

The poet's own love, concentrated in this exalted moment as never before in his life, made him surpass the limits of his poetry. Prayer, love, and philosophy break from their limits of time and creed: the ray of his love reaches beyond the person addressed and is directed towards the Creator, becoming a part of the axis of love around which the universe revolves. What reaction this poem evoked in the addressee we cannot tell. He may have been surprised and even shocked to receive so personal a reply to an apparently objective question. From other poems we know of hostility aroused by the enthusiastic appeals of the poet. He may easily, like Shelley, have found his "language misunderstood like one in a distant and savage land . . . and only repulse and disappointment." Whether the disciple understood the reply at all, whether he was worthy to be honored with such an obligation—to be the symbol of life for "the deepest thinker"—we cannot know. As the poem stands today, it addresses everyone.

UNORTHODOX TENDENCIES IN TENNYSON

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THE ROAD WHICH NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHRISTIANITY traveled was not an easy one; and the road over which she had come in the eighteenth century had not been free from pitfalls, chief of which, probably, was deism. Belief in a God who had wound up the universe like a clock only to let it run down unwatched and unheeded was scarcely a source of comfort and assurance to sensitive hearts and minds that longed to lean heavily on "everlasting arms" stronger and mightier than their own. But if the inroads of deism had been a source of concern to many churchmen as well as laymen, the problems which confronted Christians of the nineteenth century were even more soul shaking. Lyell's *Principles of Geology,* Chambers' *The Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,* Darwin's *The Origin of Species,* utilitarianism, the Malthusian doctrine of population, positivism, the movement of "higher criticism," the new science of ethnology, and the growing interest in mystical, oriental religions, all combined to confuse and bewilder the Victorian mind. Lionel Stevenson undertakes to show how great was the influence of Darwin alone upon nineteenth- and twentieth-century poets.[1]

Perhaps, in view of the conflicting ideas of his time, it is surprising that Tennyson remained as orthodox as he did in many of his beliefs. His son writes that for Tennyson religion was no "nebulous abstraction."

> He consistently emphasized his own belief in what he called the Eternal Truths; in an Omnipotent, Omnipresent and All-loving God, Who has revealed Himself through the human attribute of the highest self-sacrificing love; in the freedom of the human will; and in the immortality of the soul. . . . He dreaded the dogmatism of sects and rash definitions of God. "I dare hardly name His Name" he would say, and accordingly he named Him in "The Ancient Sage" the "Nameless." "But take away belief in the self-conscious personality of God," he said, "and you take away the backbone of the world." "On God and God-like men we build our trust."[2]

1. Lionel Stevenson, *Darwin among the Poets* (Chicago, 1932).

2. Hallam Lord Tennyson, *Alfred Lord Tennyson, A Memoir* (London, 1899), p. 261.

Despite this affirmation of faith, however, the great poet is not without unorthodox tendencies. In the year 1884, William Allingham noted in his *Diary* a conversation in which this very matter was discussed.

> As we entered the back wicket and went along the shady little walk to the house T. said, "You're not orthodox, and I can't call myself orthodox. Two things however I have always been firmly convinced of,—God,—and that death will not end my existence."[3]

In the *Memoir,* Hallam Tennyson has said that his father would not formulate a creed, for he felt that people would not understand him if he did. He did, however, consider "that his poems expressed the principles at the foundation of his faith."[4]

Upon careful examination of the poems, one discovers some unorthodox tendencies in his beliefs concerning the creation and development of man, the brotherhood of man, immortality, prayers for the dead, and eternal punishment. Although Tennyson eventually does not accept the materialistic implications of Darwinism, he does effect a compromise which leaves him rather far from the scriptural account of God's making of the earth which "was without form, and void,"[5] and of His creation of man in His own image.[6] In "In Memoriam," Tennyson would appear to accept the following interpretation of the creation of earth and of man:

> . . . . . They say,
> The solid earth whereon we tread
>
> In tracts of fluent heat began,
> And grew to seeming random forms.
> The seeming prey of cyclic storms,
> Till at last arose the man.[7]

And again, in "Locksley Hall Sixty Years After," he says:

> Many an AEon moulded earth before her highest, man, was born,
> Many an AEon too may pass when earth is manless and forlorn.[8]

3. Helen Allingham and D. Radford, ed., *William Allingham, A Diary* (London, 1907), p. 329.
4. *Op. cit.*, p. 259.
5. Genesis 1:2.
6. Genesis 1:27.
7. *Poems of Tennyson* (London, 1946), pp. 436-37.
8. Hallam Lord Tennyson, ed., *The Works of Tennyson* (New York, 1925), p. 553.

His statement concerning man in "Maud" is even more remote from the concepts of traditional Christianity, for he implies that man may not be the last or highest creation:

> As nine months go to the shaping an infant ripe for
> his birth,
> So many a million of ages have gone to the making
> of man:
> He now is first, but is he the last? is he not too base?[9]

Again, in "In Memoriam," one notes a humanistic rather than a Christian faith in the ability of man to work the beast out of himself:

> . . . . . Arise and fly
> The reeling Faun, the sensual feast;
> Move upward, working out the beast,
> And let the ape and tiger die.[10]

The orthodox Christian emphasis is upon the weakness of man and upon the strength of God, as expressed in John 15:5: "I am the vine, ye are the branches: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do nothing."

Tennyson's rather optimistic evolutionary ideas are summarized in two of his later poems, "The Dawn" and "The Making of Man." In "The Dawn," he does indeed lament the fact that "so few should have climb'd from the dens in the level below"; but he comforts himself by suggesting that perhaps man has not reached even the noontide of his existence and that he may have "twenty million of summers" in which to grow.

> Red of the Dawn!
> Is it turning a fainter red? so be it, but
> when shall we lay
> The Ghost of the Brute that is walking
> and haunting us yet, and be free?
> In a hundred, a thousand winters? Ah,
> what will our children be,
> The men of a hundred thousand, a million
> summers away?[11]

9. *Poems of Tennyson, op. cit.*, p. 475.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 437.
11. *The Works of Tennyson, op. cit.*, p. 865.

Similar ideas are expressed in "The Making of Man," but with somewhat more emphasis upon the part which God may play in the evolutionary process.

> Where is one that, born of woman, altogether can escape
> From the lower world within him, moods of tiger, or of ape?
> Man as yet is being made, and ere the crowning Age of ages,
> Shall not aeon pass and touch him into shape?
>
> All about him shadow still, but, while the races flower and fade,
> Prophet-eyes may catch a glory slowly gaining on the shade,
> Till the peoples all are one, and all their voices blend in choric
> Hallelujah to the Maker 'It is finish'd. Man is made.'[12]

This same recognition of the part that Deity may play in the evolutionary idea of progress is expressed in Tennyson's apostrophe to the bells in "In Memoriam":

> Ring out the darkness of the land,
> Ring in the Christ that is to be.[13]

Besides a somewhat unorthodox presentation of the origin and development of man, Tennyson gives to us in these poems a concept of the destiny of man which is not altogether in accord with traditional Christianity. Tennyson would appear to believe in the salvation of man as a race; whereas the Church sees as saved only those who name the name of Jesus Christ in faith.[14] Moreover the golden age, according

12. *Ibid.*, p. 865.

13. *Poems of Tennyson, op. cit.*, p. 430.

14. "They are also to be had accursed, that presume to say, that every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that law, and the light of nature. For holy scripture doth set out unto us only the name of Jesus Christ, whereby men must be saved" (Article of Religion XVIII). *Church of England Book of Homilies* (Philadelphia, 1844), p. 595.

to Scripture, is to be ushered in not by the "valiant man," but by the "second Adam from above," who is to return to earth even as he ascended from it[15] and to reign upon earth a thousand years.[16]

Another not strictly orthodox idea running through most of Tennyson's work is that of the universal brotherhood of man, which assumes, of course, the universal Fatherhood of God. This concept is most clearly stated in one of his later poems, "Ode for the Opening of the International Exhibition, 1862."

> O ye, the wise who think, the wise who reign,
> From growing commerce loose her latest chain,
> And let the fair white-winged peacemaker fly
> To happy havens under all the sky,
> And mix the seasons and the golden hours,
> Till each man find his own in all men's good,
> And all men work in noble brotherhood,
> Breaking their mailed fleets and armed towers,
> And ruling by obeying nature's powers,
> And gathering all the fruits of earth and crown'd with
> all her flowers.[17]

The Scripture, however, does not imply that the human race has been an unbroken family since the time of the Fall nor that it ever can be, apart from relationship to Christ. Christ comments upon this relationship in Mark 3:35: "For whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother." Paul discusses this subject somewhat at length in the fourth chapter of Galatians, after he has laid the foundation for Christian brotherhood in the third chapter:

> For ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.[18]

Tennyson's earlier ideas apparently more closely approximated the traditional ones in his "Supposed Confessions of a Second-rate Sensi-

15. Acts 1:11.
16. Revelation 20:1-6.
17. *Poems of Tennyson, op. cit.*, p. 733.
18. Galatians 3:26-28.

tive Mind not in Unity with Itself," although even in this poem he speaks in rather large, general terms:

> . . . . . Men pass me by;
> Christians with happy countenances—
> And children all seem full of Thee!
> And women smile with saint-like glances
> Like Thine own mother's when she bow'd
> Above Thee, on that happy morn
> When angels spake to men aloud,
> And Thou and peace to earth were born.
> Goodwill to me as well as all—
> I one of them: My brothers they:
> Brothers in Christ—a world of peace
> And confidence, day after day;
> And trust and hope till things should cease,
> And then one Heaven receive us all.[19]

It is interesting to note that much as Tennyson longed to believe in immortality, there were many times when his emotional answers to his problems did not seem to satisfy even himself. All that he could reply, when, in 1863, a stranger wrote to question him as to his belief in a hereafter, was that he sympathized with his grief and that, if faith meant anything at all, it meant "trusting to those instincts, or feelings, or whatever they may be called, which assure us of some life after this."[20] Five years later, Allingham made the following entry in his *Diary:*

> Luncheon. Then T. and I walk into croquet-ground, talking of Christianity.
> 'What I want,' he said, 'is an assurance of immortality.'[21]

As early as the "Supposed Confessions," of course, he had longed "to hold a common scorn of death" and an abiding belief in immortality.[22] By the time he had worked through the struggles, trials, and problems that form the basis of "In Memoriam," Tennyson seemed to have come to the conclusion that the strong Son of God, the embodiment of im-

19. *Poems of Tennyson, op. cit.,* p. 15.
20. Hallam Tennyson, *op. cit.,* p. 416.
21. *Op. cit.,* p. 185.
22. *Poems of Tennyson,* pp. 15-16.

mortal Love, since He was a just God, would not allow man to die.[23] The assurance of this beautiful poem, however, apparently was not sufficient to carry him through a lifetime, if we are to accept the entry from Allingham's *Diary* quoted above. Even in the exquisite little poem, "Crossing the Bar," written in 1889, one detects a wistful note when the poet says:

> I hope to see my Pilot face to face
> When I have crost the bar.[24]

The word "hope" is scarcely one of strong assurance.

Certainly Tennyson cannot be called a pantheist or a mystic, but, upon occasion, one finds touches of pantheism and mysticism in the man. Hallam writes as follows (1850):

> Throughout his life he had a constant feeling of a spiritual harmony existing between ourselves and the outward visible Universe, and of the actual Immanence of God in the infinitesimal atom as in the vastest system. "If God," he would say, "were to withdraw Himself for one single instant from this Universe, everything would vanish into nothingness." When speaking on that subject he said to Me: "My most passionate desire is to have a clearer and fuller vision of God. The soul seems to me one with God, how I cannot tell. I can sympathize with God in my poor little way." In some phases of thought and feeling his idealism tended more decidedly to mysticism. He wrote: "A kind of waking trance I have frequently had quite up from boyhood, when I have been all alone. This has generally come upon me thro' repeating my own name two or three times to myself silently, till all at once, as it were out of the intensity of the consciousness of individuality, the individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this not a confused state, but the clearest of the clearest, the surest of the surest, the weirdest of the weirdest, utterly beyond words, where death was an almost laughable impossibility, the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction but the only true life."[25]

In the year of 1865, Allingham records a conversation touching upon this same subject:

> Tennyson now took Barnes and me to his top room. Darwinism—"Man from ape—would that really make any difference?" Huxley, Tyndall.
> "Time is nothing," said T. "are we not all part of Deity?" "Pantheism?"

23. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
24. *The Works of Tennyson, op. cit.*, p. 869.
25. Hallam Tennyson, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

hinted Barnes, who was not at ease in this sort of speculation. "Well!" says T., "I think I believe in Pantheism, of a sort."[26]

In the midst of his speculation concerning Hallam and immortality Tennyson gives way to this kind of meditation:

> What art thou then? I cannot guess;
> But tho' I seem in star and flower
> To feel thee some diffusive power,
> I do not therefore love thee less:
>
> My love involves the love before;
> My love is vaster passion now;
> Tho' mix'd with God and Nature thou,
> I seem to love thee more and more.[27]

"The Higher Pantheism" and "De Profundis" state even more pointedly his mystical view of the universe and indicate his attempt to reconcile the physical principles of evolution with the idea of spiritual evolution or purpose.

One cannot be sure whether Tennyson believed in the efficacy of prayers for the dead, but in at least two of his poems he makes reference to this kind of prayer. In "The Passing of Arthur" he makes Arthur say:

> . . . . . but thou,
> If thou shouldst never see my face again,
> Pray for my soul.[28]

Again, in "Maud" Tennyson causes the young man, distracted and wretched after having killed his sweetheart's brother to cry:

> Not a bell was rung, not a prayer was read;
> It is that which makes us loud in the world of the dead.[29]

True, the young man was not actually dead; but since he imagines himself to be, the implications of the speech are much the same as if he were: Orthodox Protestantism, of course, believes that man's op-

26. *Op. cit.*, p. 127.
27. "In Memoriam," *Poems of Tennyson, op. cit.*, p. 443.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 713.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 509.

portunity for salvation is in this life, and that nothing can be done for man after his soul has left the body.[30]

An idea which seems to have been particularly repugnant to Tennyson is that of eternal punishment. He seldom mentions it in his poems, but "Despair" is written sympathetically enough to make one feel that the doctrine of everlasting punishment is anathema to him. As a matter of fact, both Allingham and Hallam allude to his aversion to this doctrine. Allingham reports a conversation in which Tennyson spoke of "Eternal Punishment" as being an "obsolete belief."[31] And Hallam writes as follows:

> One day towards the end of his life he bade me look into the Revised Version and see how the Revisers had translated the passage "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire." His disappointment was keen when he found that the translators had not altered "everlasting" into "aeonian". . . or some such word: for he never would believe that Christ could preach "everlasting punishment."[32]

Many of Tennyson's statements concerning God and His relationship to man do not constitute unorthodoxies, but they do indicate that often all his mind "is clouded with a doubt."[33] Much of the uncertainty of "The Second-rate Mind" remains with him throughout life. Hallam writes in 1850:

> But he was occasionally much troubled with the intellectual problem of the apparent profusion and waste of life and by the vast amount of sin and suffering throughout the world, for these seemed to militate against the idea of the Omnipotent and All-loving Father.
>
> No doubt in such moments he might possibly have been heard to say what I myself have heard him say: "An Omnipotent Creator Who could make such a painful world is to me *sometimes* as hard to believe in as to believe in blind matter behind everything. The lavish profusion too in the natural world appalls me, from the growths of the tropical forest to the capacity of man to multiply, the torrent of babies."
>
> "I can almost understand some of the Gnostic heresies, which only after all put the difficulty one step further back":
>
> "O me! for why is all around us here
> As if some lesser god had made the world,

30. See Article of Religion XXII, "Of Purgatory," *Church of England Book of Homilies*, p. 595.

31. *Op. cit.*, p. 328.

32. *Op. cit.*, p. 270.

33. "The Passing of Arthur," *Poems of Tennyson*, p. 713.

But had not force to shape it as he would,
Till the High God behold it from beyond
And enter it, and make it beautiful?"[34]

These troublesome thoughts are, of course, reflected in "In Memoriam," especially in sections fifty-three through fifty-five. Even section CXXIII, toward the very end of the poem, speaks of "The Power in darkness whom we guess."[35]

One would conclude that Tennyson was not really happy or triumphant in his faith even in his later years; for, on Friday, February 1, 1867, Allingham writes, "T. is unhappy from his uncertainty regarding the condition and destiny of man."[36] And, as late as December 5, 1884, he records him as saying, "I have always felt that there must be somewhere *Some one who knows*—that is, *God.* But I am in hopes that I shall find something human in Him too."[37]

It is easy enough to concede that Tennyson was a great poet, even a great Christian poet; but it is difficult to conceive of his orthodoxy as being entirely satisfactory to his hearers if expounded in some simple nineteenth-century parish church. One has the feeling that the people would be left confused and bewildered.

34. *Op. cit.*, p. 263.
35. *Poems of Tennyson, op. cit.*, p. 440.
36. *Op. cit.*, p. 149.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 339.

McTAGGART'S CONCEPTION OF THE BEATIFIC VISION

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IN THE CONCLUDING PARAGRAPHS of the chapter on Hegelianism and Christianity in his *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,* McTaggart makes the following pregnant observation:

> Christian apologists have not infrequently met the attacks of their opponents with Hegelian arguments. And as long as there are external enemies to meet, the results are all that they can desire. Against Scepticism, against Materialism, against Spinozistic Pantheism, against Deism or Arianism—nothing is easier than to prove by the aid of Hegel that wherever such creeds differ from orthodox Christianity, they are in the wrong. But this is not the end. The ally who has been called in proves to be an enemy in disguise—the least evident but the most dangerous. The doctrines which have been protected from external refutation are found to be transforming themselves till they are on the point of melting away, and orthodoxy finds it necessary to separate itself from so insidious an ally.
>
> This double relation of Hegelianism to Christian orthodoxy can be explained by the theory which I have propounded. If orthodox Christianity, while incompatible with Hegelianism, is nevertheless closer to it than any other religion, it is natural that Hegelianism should support Christianity against all attacks but its own, and should then reveal itself as an antagonist all the more deadly because it works not by denial but by completion. (Sec. 264).

It is not with the justice of this comment that I am now concerned. Perhaps most of us who have read McTaggart would feel inclined to agree with Dr. Broad's assertion that "if McTaggart's account of Hegelianism be taken as a whole and compared with Hegel's writings as a whole, the impression produced is one of profound unlikeness. 'Whatever Hegel may have meant,' the reader says to himself, 'it surely cannot have been this.' 'And,' he hastens to add, 'it was probably nothing nearly so sensible or plausible as this.' "[1] My present intention, however, is to raise the kindred question, To what extent can the claim which McTaggart makes for Hegel be plausibly advanced on behalf of his own philosophy? Needless to say, it is a question much easier to ask than to answer. Yet it is one well worth asking, if it be true, as Dr. Broad has affirmed, that "the system expounded in the *Nature of Existence* is

1. Introduction to the second edition of McTaggart's *Some Dogmas of Religion,* p. xxxi.

equal in scope and originality to any of the great historical systems of European philosophy, whilst in clearness of statement and cogency of argument it far surpasses them all."[2]

To attempt a detailed examination both of Christian orthodoxy and of McTaggart's philosophy would obviously be an undertaking which would involve at least a volume. Accordingly, what I propose to do is to compare and contrast the conceptions of man's last end which they respectively proffer us. The advantage of so proceeding is that, in each instance, we thus place our finger upon the very pulse of the spiritual life. For religion is not merely a theoretical but also an intensely practical affair. Man is concerned, not only with knowing, but also with being and becoming. Moreover, it is in their agreement that there is a definite goal toward which we all may strive that the various historic religions are most at one. Although, if we contrast the mental outlook of an accomplished theologian—such as St. Thomas—with that of a Jain philosopher who has no theology at all, we might conclude that the two have nothing in common, yet, if we look more closely, we shall discover that the Jain, like St. Thomas, and like every other adherent of a faith that is intellectually mature, is endeavoring to orient himself with respect to his last end. Negatively conceived, such an end may be described as deliverance, emancipation, salvation; positively conceived, it may be described as attainment, fruition, blessedness.

Upon the reality of this last end all the great world-faiths are agreed. It is in their conceptions of it, and of its metaphysical setting, that they differ. When we survey these various differences, however, we find that they can all be subsumed under one or another of three clearly defined types.

In the first place there is the outlook of the theist for whom man's last end consists in communion with a living God, wholly other than, yet wholy united with, the illumined soul. In this direct, intuitive vision *facies ad faciem*, in this fellowship of mind with mind, in this ecstasy of love given and received, he sees the final goal of the religious quest, the supreme good in comparison with which all other goods are non-essential. It is significant that the burning devotion of the mystic has compelled the Christian theologian to identify heaven itself with the Beatific Vision. Thus, in Boehme's *Dialogue between a Scholar and his Master concerning the Super-Sensual Life*, the former asks with respect

2. *Ibid.*, p. xliii.

to the departing soul, "Doth it not enter into heaven or hell, as a man entereth into a house, or goeth through a door or passage into another place"? "No," replies the Master, "there is no such kind of entering; for heaven and hell are present everywhere, and it is but the turning of the will either into God's love or into his anger, that introduceth into them."[3]

In Sufism, it is worth observing, the same emphasis upon the supreme blessedness of mystical union is achieved by a different device. Heaven, far from being equated with the vision of God, is sharply distinguished from it; hence the desire for paradise is denounced as polytheism, inasmuch as it involves setting one's heart upon something other than God. This point of view is given forceful expression in the words of Abu'l Hasan Khurqānī: "I do not say that Paradise and Hell are non-existent, but I say that they are nothing to me, because God created them both, and there is no room for any created object in the place where I am."[4] The same thought is expressed less egotistically and more charmingly in Rābi'a's prayer, "O God! whatever share of this world Thou hast allotted to me, bestow it on Thine enemies; and whatever share of the next world Thou hast allotted to me, bestow it on Thy friends. Thou art enough for me."[5] And what is true of Christianity and Sufism is true of theism the world over. Everywhere we find present and active the same tendency to conceive of man's last end in terms of personal relationship to a personal God, of a fellowship productive of utter satisfaction.

In the second place, there is the pantheistic point of view, which either holds that personal relationships do not exist between man and God, or—if it admit them at all—denies their ultimacy. To the mystic in the flood tide of his enthusiasm, it seems that the deepest intimacy involves a passing beyond the realm of I and Thou to a state of absorption or identification. Even in Christian mysticism, we find this urge manifesting itself. Thus Ruysbroeck desires to penetrate beyond the Trinity into the Undifferentiated Godhead, that "dark silence where all lovers lose themselves."[6] But, for the most graphic, succinct, and passionate expressions of this yearning, we must turn, as we so often have to do, to the Sufis. In the following poem, strangely modern in spirit, yet withal

3. See Watkin's reprint of the Bath edition of *The Way to Christ*, pp. 273 f.
4. R. A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, p. 87.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
6. See C. A. Wynschenk Dom's translation of *The Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage*, p. 178.

thoroughly Sufi, Jalalu'd Din Rumi gives eloquent utterance to this type of piety.

> I died as mineral and became a plant,
> I died as plant and rose to animal,
> I died as animal and I was man.
> Why should I fear? When was I less by dying?
> Yet once more shall I die as man, to soar
> With angels blest; but even from angelhood
> I must pass on: all except God doth perish.
> When I have sacrificed my angel soul
> I shall become what no heart e'er conceived.
> Oh, let me not exist! for Non-existence
> Proclaims in organ tones, "To Him we shall return."[7]

And, in the third place, there is the outlook at once spiritualistic and atheistic, positing neither a personal God nor an all-devouring One, which we associate primarily with India, and which there appears in the Sāṁkhya and Mīmāṁsā philosophies and in Jainism. Each of these systems regards the soul or self as a permanent entity, involved during its sojourn in this world in error and evil, yet inherently capable of escaping from both. The self is the master of its own destiny. By spiritual training and self-discipline it can attain liberation, and so pass beyond birth and death. As to the nature of this liberated state there is, however, an important difference of opinion. The Sāṁkhya and Mīmāṁsā philosophies conceive of it negatively rather than positively. Deliverance, they teach, involves the dissociation of spirit and matter, and cessation on the part of the self from contact with physical objects. Since sorrow is, on this view, a more fundamental characteristic of experience than pleasure, it follows that elimination of the former carries with it elimination of the latter. Hence there is no ultimate bliss to be attained; there is only the termination of suffering. Jainism, on the other hand, regards the situation more optimistically. Positive bliss and boundless knowledge, it affirms, are the lot of the emancipated self. But, on either view, the self is an abiding and essential constituent of reality. It is neither created nor destroyed. Its end is the transcendence of all limitations and the full development of its highest capacities. And this end it attains, not, primarily, through the favor and by the aid of a superhuman

7. Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

self, nor yet through the loss of its own individuality, but by persistent obedience to the laws of the universe of which it is a part, whereby it is enabled to become the best that it has in it to be.

Now it would be very near the truth to assert that this third conception of man's last end has been introduced into western thought in the philosophy of McTaggart—near the truth, yet not quite the truth. It is, indeed, the case that McTaggart's view of man's last end does, in certain of its broad outlines, resemble that of the Hindu philosophies I have mentioned. His metaphysics, that is to say, is pluralistic and atheistic. Yet, if there be similarities, there are also profound differences, the nature of which will become apparent as we proceed.

There is, of course, no question of direct borrowing from Oriental sources on the part of McTaggart. He noted, indeed, with interest, the resemblances between his own conclusions and those of various eastern thinkers; yet his theory of man's destiny was developed out of his study of Hegel, and, in his later period after he had become convinced that it was necessary to abandon Hegel's dialectical method, was supported by arguments which, whatever else may be said of them, were certainly highly original.

Before we proceed further, however, it is essential that we should understand in what sense McTaggart was an atheist. As an ontological idealist he stands at the opposite pole from the materialist. And, in so far as religion can be identified with a concern for man's destiny both in this world and the next, his outlook is profoundly religious. No less than theism is his view utterly opposed to any philosophy which attempts to treat the individual self as an emergent or as a phenomenon, to derive it from that which is beneath it or to lose it in that which is above it. His attitude with respect to theism is, in fact, quite clear; yet it is perpetually liable to misrepresentation.

The word *God,* McTaggart points out, has been used both in popular phraseology and in theology to connote a being who is conceived of as personal. The history of religion fully bears out his assertion, not only with regard to the English word *God,* but also with regard to its equivalents in other languages. We all know what Osiris and Horus, Zeus and Apollo, Woden and Thor, or—to take a higher ground—what Ahura Mazda, Yahweh, and Allah, were supposed to be: namely, living conscious intelligences with whom it was possible to enter into personal relations. In philosophy, however, there is no corresponding unanimity.

Thus various thinkers—Spinoza and Hegel among others—have used the word *God* to signify "all that truly exists, provided only that it possesses some sort of unity, and is not a mere aggregate, or a mere chaos."[8] This diversity of usage must be pronounced unfortunate, inasmuch as it is productive of a "dangerous ambiguity."[9] "It is impossible," McTaggart observes, "to keep philosophical terms for the use of philosophical students. Whenever the subject is one of general interest—and the existence of a God is certainly one of these—the opinions of great philosophers will be reported at second hand to the world at large."[10]

Since, therefore, a uniform usage is desirable, it is clearly the duty of philosophy to conform to that of religion and theology, and this for three reasons. In the first place, we cannot hope to change popular usage, inasmuch as this would involve altering the habitual phraseology of millions of people. In the second place, the average man has no substitute for the word *God,* whereas the philosopher can always talk about the Absolute. And, in the third place, the usage of philosophy is not itself uniform. Kant and Lotze, for instance, use the word *God* in the religious and theological sense.[11] Consequently, unless we believe in a God who is a Person, we ought to call ourselves atheists.[12]

To this conclusion Dr. Broad has advanced the objection that, if McTaggart's definition of God be taken strictly, "we should have to say that all Christians are atheists."[13] The point would have been put more accurately if he had written "that all Trinitarians are atheists," for not all Christians are Trinitarians. It is, of course, true that the Trinity cannot be a Person, since it is composed of three Persons.[14] But it does not at all follow that we should be forced to classify Trinitarians as

8. *The Nature of Existence,* vol. II, sec. 489.

9. *Loc. cit.;* cf. *Some Dogmas of Religion,* p. 188.

10. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,* p. 93.

11. *Some Dogmas of Religion, loc. cit.*

12. McTaggart's discussion of this subject is to be found in *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,* sec. 96; in *Some Dogmas of Religion,* secs. 152-153; and in *The Nature of Existence,* vol. II. secs. 488-89.

13. *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy,* II, II, 643.

14. Cf. Clement C. J. Webb's remark: "It is so often taken for granted that the Personality of God is a principal tenet of Christianity that it is not without surprise that we find this expression not only entirely absent from the historical creeds and confessions of the Christian Church, but even, until quite modern times, in the estimation of all but the minority of Christians who reject the doctrine of the Trinity, regarded as unorthodox." *God and Personality,* p. 61.

atheists; on the contrary, we might more appropriately term them unconscious tri-theists.

Those thinkers who use the word *God* in the sense in which Spinoza and Hegel used it are wont to say, consistently enough, that it is quite certain *that* God is, and that our sole task is to determine *what* he is. McTaggart's position is the direct antithesis of this. According to him, we know very well *what* God's nature is—that is to say, what we mean by the word *God;* the only question is, Does any existent entity actually possess this nature? McTaggart, then, would seem to be an atheist in the religious and theological, and—as he maintains—in the properly philosophical meaning of the word: namely, in the sense that he does not believe in a personal God. This is, indeed, the case; yet McTaggart does not completely close the door upon the theist, but leaves it slightly ajar. A few words of explanation will make my meaning clear.

In the first place, McTaggart is quite certain that God is not identical with the Absolute, for the Absolute includes all that exists, consequently it includes all selves. But, for McTaggart, it is an ultimate, synthetic, and self-evident proposition that one self cannot be included within another self.[15] Hence the Absolute cannot be a self, and so cannot be God. In the second place, the common view that God is at once omnipotent, creative, and good, is regarded by McTaggart as untenable. For there is evil in the universe, and this evil a good God would not tolerate, and an omnipotent God could prevent. In the third place, the hypothesis of a non-omnipotent creative God is rejected on the same ground, since a God who creates, even if non-omnipotent, is responsible for the nature of that which is created, inasmuch as it is an expression of his will. Moreover, the notion of creation is incompatible with McTaggart's doctrine of the unreality of time.

This leaves us with the hypothesis of a non-omnipotent, non-creative God, which McTaggart considers much more defensible. We cannot, indeed, assume that there is a non-omnipotent, non-creative Person who controls and governs the universe, for "it is only in time that the terms of a causal relation can be discriminated into a cause which is not an effect, and an effect which is not a cause, and so, since time is unreal, there can be no divine control."[16] Nevertheless, we must consider the

15. See *The Nature of Existence,* vol. II, secs. 401-4.
16. *Ibid.,* p. 182.

possibility that there may be a self who *appears* to control the universe. "I see no reason," says McTaggart, "why there should not be such a person."[17] And, if there were, "the statement that there was a God would not be true, but it would have as close a relation to the truth as the statements that there are mountains in Switzerland, and that thunder follows lighting."[18] "Such a being would be really a person, and really good. But he would not really be God, for his supreme power would not be real but apparent."[19]

There are two aspects of this conception which are of considerable interest. In the first place, it seems clear that McTaggart's apparent deity, like the gods of the Hindu philosophies to which I referred—who are themselves involved in the process of birth and death—is, *sub specie temporis,* himself in need of salvation rather than in a position to bestow it. And, in the second place, it is to be observed that, according to the view before us, when time fades into eternity God will cease to be God as men will cease to be men, and, on a basis of fully developed selfhood, they will one and all enjoy complete equality. We have here a remote analogy to the old Christian doctrine of deification, the equalitarianism being, of course, a characteristic peculiar to McTaggart's theory.

Would such a notion of God possess any religious value? McTaggart is doubtful whether it would have much. Napoleon would be said, in ordinary language, to have influenced the course of events in Europe to a vastly greater degree than did any one of his grenadiers. And it might be said of our apparent God, McTaggart observes, that

> if we regard him as supremely powerful in the same way in which we regard Napoleon as more powerful than the grenadier, we have got all that is practically wanted. But it may be doubted whether a religious emotion does not require to be based on something which is believed to be absolutely true. My feelings of fear and admiration towards Napoleon would probably not be diminished by my conclusion, based on philosophical arguments, that he was not powerful in absolute reality, but only appeared to be so, as there appear to be mountains in Switzerland. But then these emotions are not religious. And would the emotions with which I might regard a person whom I believed to be really God remain at all the same if I came to believe that he only appeared to be God?"[20]

17. *Ibid.,* p. 183.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*

The question is one which does not greatly trouble McTaggart since, while he sees no impossibility in the existence of such a self, he sees not the faintest reason to believe that he actually does exist. Yet it is one which may concern us, inasmuch as we may conceivably find such a reason. I suggest, therefore, that the notion of such a self is capable of playing a greater rôle than McTaggart conceded it. For, even if it be true that time is unreal, and that consequently, as McTaggart contended,[21] no causal relations can really hold between the self who appears to be God and other selves, still it would seem that there must be eternal relations which appear as causal relations, and which must be of great importance. In this connection, I wish to call attention to Dr. Broad's criticism of McTaggart's argument with respect to causal relations:

> I think that the argument is quite inconclusive, even if we accept McTaggart's analysis of causal propositions. According to this, the causal relation involves a relation of conveyance between certain characteristics. Now it is quite true that instances can be produced in which the relation of conveyance between two characteristics is reciprocal. E.g., being an equilateral triangle is conveyed by being an equiangular triangle. But it is also easy to produce instances in which the relation is not reciprocal. E.g., to take an example of McTaggart's, being now drunk conveys having drunk alcohol, but having drunk alcohol does not convey being now drunk. Or, to take a non-temporal example, being coloured conveys being spatial, but being spatial does not convey being coloured. Therefore there is no impossibility in there being a non-reciprocal relation of conveyance between certain timeless states of a certain self and certain other timeless states of all the rest of the selves in the universe.[22]

The criticism appears to be a just one. And the timeless relations between the self who appears as God—whom we may well call the *central* self—and the other selves must surely involve a peculiar intimacy which might well become the object of religious emotion.

It has seemed worth while thus briefly to review McTaggart's discussion of the problem of God for two reasons: first, to bring out the fact that his position is not utterly antagonistic to theism; and secondly—and this is of far greater importance—to show how completely divorced from the notion of God is his conception of man's last end. For, as we have seen, God is in no sense the bestower of salvation. In this respect McTaggart's outlook resembles that of the three Hindu philosophies which I have mentioned. On the other hand, his view differs from theirs

21. See above, p. 35.
22. *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, II, II, 650.

in that he does not regard the attainment of salvation as dependent upon the free will of the individual, for, like the Calvinist, McTaggart is a strict determinist. Again, according to the Hindu thinkers, while the liberation of souls is perpetually going on, yet the temporal process will never come to an end, and since the number of souls is infinite, there will never be a time when all souls have been emancipated. For McTaggart, however, all selves, after undergoing an indefinite number of births and deaths, attain beatitude together at the end of the temporal process, as time fades into eternity. Salvation is thus identified with the transition from appearance to reality and from time to eternity. This notion of a heaven which is at once timeless and yet future bears, as McTaggart points out,[23] a distinct resemblance to the Christian conception. Furthermore, as salvation in his view is the ultimate destiny of all selves, McTaggart clasps hands with the Universalist.

Unlike the metaphysicians of the Sāṁkhya and Mīmāṁsā schools, with their emphasis upon the negative aspect of deliverance, McTaggart holds that the experience of the self, when freed from the illusion of time, will have a thoroughly positive content. He entirely concurs with the atheistic Jains, and with the pantheistic and theistic mystics, in maintaining that it will be an experience of bliss or beatitude. Moreover, he agrees with the theist that it will be an experience of love, of intense and soul-satisfying affection.

Sub specie temporis, love assumes various forms—the love of the sexes, the love of kinsfolk, the love of friends. It may arise in connection with physical desire, with blood-relationship, with habitual contact, with community of interests, or even for no apparent reason at all. But, whenever it does arise, it constitutes its own justification and presents itself as the supreme value. Moreover it brings with it a profound restlessness, a restlessness which springs from the desire to intuit directly the soul of the person loved. In this life the realization of that desire is impossible. We know others, even those dearest to us, only indirectly, through bodily manifestations. In eternity, however, it is otherwise. There the corresponding relation is one of direct perception by lover of beloved, there the accompanying emotion is far more intense than any which can be felt, or even imagined, here, and yet—because of the directness of the perception, and the completeness and intimacy of the union which this implies—the experience is one of utter satisfaction. Where there is

23. *The Nature of Existence,* vol. II, secs. 738-39.

neither change nor duration, there can be no sense of satiety; where the highest potentialities are brought to realization there can be no sense of inadequacy. This is the Beatific Vision, the enjoyment of which awaits us at the end of time. It is not a vision of God, but, in the case of each of us, it is a vision of those other selves who form the "differentiating group"[24] to which we belong. If there be any self who, *sub specie temporis,* appears as God, that self, *sub specie aeternitatis,* will be known and loved by the selves who perceive him precisely as other selves are known and loved.

From this consummation we are separated by that portion of the temporal series of events which stretches before us. Nevertheless, there are moments when, as McTaggart says, "it is curiously near us."[25] *Sub specie temporis,* the experience of love, however it arise and whatever form it take, constitutes, in McTaggart's words, "a strange dash into reality."[26] Though it lacks the intensity and intuitive directness which are present in the Absolute, it is still the very stuff of which eternity is made. Other values, indeed, are to be found there—knowledge, pleasure, virtue, and fulness of life. Yet none of these, nor any combination of these, can equal the value of love when it surpasses a certain degree of intensity,[27] and in the Absolute its intensity is at an extremely high level. The good and evil which characterize the various stages of the temporal series are, of course, preserved in the eternal. They qualify subordinate states included within it, but they do not qualify the Absolute as a whole; thus neither positive evil nor deficiency of good vitiates the unmixed good which characterizes it.

As we thus glance swiftly over the main outlines of his system, we may not inappropriately recall those lines of A. E.'s which might well have been written with McTaggart's philosophy in mind:

> I know when I come to my own immortal I will find there
> In a myriad instant all that the wandering soul found fair,
> Empires that never crumbled and thrones all glorious yet,
> And hearts ere they were broken and eyes ere they were wet.[28]

In this unavoidably brief and inadequate survey, I have sought to

24. See *The Nature of Existence,* vol. II, ch. xxxix.
25. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,* p. 253; *Philosophical Studies,* p. 213.
26. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,* p. 262; *Philosophical Studies,* p. 226.
27. *The Nature of Existence,* vol. II, sec. 851.
28. *Song and Its Fountains,* p. 48.

delineate the principal features of McTaggart's doctrine of eternal life, and of the Beatific Vision which is the content of that life. To deal in a short space with the complicated arguments advanced for its support would, needless to say, be impossible. The entire theory is, of course, based upon the doctrine of the unreality of time. The arguments whereby this basic doctrine is defended do not, indeed, depend upon conclusions previously reached in *The Nature of Existence,* and consequently can be examined without involving the rest of McTaggart's system; in the present connection, however, I can only say of them that they do not appear to me to have been satisfactorily refuted.[29] The positive characteristics of the theory in question, on the other hand, follow from the doctrine of determining correspondence; and it may be asserted that this last has been hopelessly ruined by the critique of Dr. Broad.[30] It is true that we cannot know what McTaggart might have said in reply to the points there made, and it is, perhaps, premature to conclude that the ruin is as irreparable as, at first glance, it appears to be. Nevertheless, even if we grant that the doctrine of determining correspondence is untenable, it does not follow that there is nothing left in McTaggart's theory of the Beatific Vision worthy of our consideration. After all, its main outlines are almost identical with those of the position elaborated in the *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,* where very different arguments are employed to establish them. And, surely, the history of philosophy is full of instances where profound insight has outstripped logical demonstration.

Let me put the point in this way. If the naturalist or the emergent evolutionist be right, and what is higher has evolved—however mysteriously—from what is lower, a religious[31] view of the universe is rendered impossible. If, on the other hand, the universe be an intelligibly ordered system, and if values, as objective realities, be harmoniously included within that system, a religious attitude becomes inevitable. Now McTaggart has advanced a novel judgment as to the axiological primacy and metaphysical significance of love. Accordingly, anyone who believes that the universe is an intelligible system, whether because of McTaggart's arguments or for other reasons, is bound to con-

29. See my article entitled, "Dr. Broad's Refutation of McTaggart's Arguments for the Unreality of Time" in *The Philosophical Review* (Nov. 1941).

30. *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy,* vol. I, bk. v.

31. We can, of course, apply the term *religion* to some ethical or political program, but then we are no longer talking about what has been meant historically by *religion.*

sider whether the above judgment be true or false; and, if he accept it as true, he must also consider what the consequences will be for his general metaphysical outlook. I submit, therefore, that McTaggart has given the theist a great deal to think about, and that it behooves him to consider it with the utmost care.

Much of the non-theistic philosophy of our time has been written by men who are obviously strangers in the field of religious experience. All too frequently a shallow optimism betrays a woeful ignorance of values. In the present instance, however, it can scarcely fail to be recognized that McTaggart's doctrine of eternal life and of the Beatific Vision could have been elaborated only by a man of deep spirituality and a keen sense of values. What he has to say, therefore, is all the more worth listening to.

The contemporary theist is busy refuting the claims of an emergent-evolutionary naturalism, the general acceptance of which, he rightly believes, would prove disastrous to religion, to morality, and to civilization. From this point of view there is nothing to fear from McTaggart. His teaching provides the totalitarian with no material for propaganda. He is too difficult, too profound, too otherworldly. He is himself a religionist, and thus a fellow-citizen of the theist's. For the moment, then, he may be safely disregarded; but for the moment only. The present popularity of naturalism is largely due to three causes: (1) the reaction from an orthodoxy which seems no longer tenable; (2) the interest and excitement produced by various developments in physical science; and (3) the aspirations of a political radicalism which recognizes no moral standards. But this popularity will pass. The present intellectual and political turmoil will not endure forever. The inability of naturalism to provide a satisfactory foundation for civilization will become increasingly apparent, and, though it will doubtless long remain the favorite philosophy in certain circles, it is likely to be supplanted in popular estimation by a type of thinking of a more spiritual cast.

It is improbable, however, that its successor will be any form of orthodoxy; unless, indeed, general exhaustion cause the intellectual powers of mankind to undergo a complete eclipse. In liberal quarters the weaknesses of classical theism are widely acknowledged, and the effort is being made to rethink the whole problem. Such men as Professors Brightman, Dawes Hicks, and Hartshorne—to name no others—have already entered upon this task. And, as the undertaking progresses, the

question is bound to arise, Can the theist answer McTaggart? Is his doctrine susceptible either of refutation or assimilation? And failure either to refute or to assimilate will mean that McTaggart has vanquished "not by denial but by completion."

Doubtless some will contend that McTaggart's philosophy, involving as it does, the unreality of time, is by that very fact ruled out of court. In reply to this objection, there are two things to be said. In the first place, the estimate of the value of love professes to be ultimate and self-evident, and consequently depends upon no prior assumptions. Hence, if true, it should be taken account of. And, in the second place, it is worth pointing out that it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile any conception—be it McTaggart's, the Christian, or any other—of a last end for man with an extreme temporalism.[32] Is final attainment conceivable so long as the permanent possibility of change remains; for, if such a possibility be real, must it not at some time pass into actuality? The philosophies of temporalism, however, have their own difficulties which, I should suggest, are not less formidable than those which confront McTaggart. Before adopting any one of them, therefore, the theist will do well to look before he leaps.

Obviously, it is not McTaggart's critique of theism that we have to examine so much as the implications of his positive teaching. The arguments which he brings against the theistic position are weighty, yet they are by no means wholy unfamiliar. The reality of evil, the relation of time to eternity—these are old problems with which theism has wrestled in the past, not always too successfully, and with which it will doubtless be ready to wrestle again. But, in his doctrine of the Beatific Vision, we have something which is new. And about it there is a spiritual magnificence to which the philosophy of religion cannot afford to be blind, even though it be to the conventional theist a stumbling block, and to the naturalist foolishness. We find, indeed, a hint of his teaching—as McTaggart himself has pointed out[33]—in the first epistle of St. John, and much of what he has written sounds like a commentary on the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians. Yet these hallowed documents contain at most unconscious anticipations. In his explicit recog-

32. See my article, "This-worldliness and Otherworldliness, Time and Eternity," in *The Review of Religion* (Jan. 1944).

33. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 121, n. 1.

nition of love *as such*—as distinct from altruism and benevolence[34]—as the supreme value, in his conception of it as involving a direct and eternal relation between selves, and in his estimate of its metaphysical importance, we have either a genuinely fresh insight or a fantastic dream.

It is easy to follow the example of Dr. Broad,[35] and to accuse McTaggart of sentimentality. But what do we mean by sentimentality? If we mean by it the affectation of emotion where none is felt, the charge is obviously unjust. McTaggart is transparently sincere and passionately in earnest. If we mean by sentimentality the undue exaltation of emotion, the exaggeration of it, or the wasting of it upon an undeserving object, then we beg the question with a word. McTaggart can be guilty of such things only if he be mistaken in his judgment that love of a certain depth and intensity is a greater good than any other value or possible combination of values, and it is precisely the soundness of this judgment which is now in question. Since it professes to be ultimate and self-evident, it cannot be argued about; it must be either simply accepted or rejected. If we accept it, we shall no doubt be called sentimentalists by those who reject it; yet we should not be very courageous if we permitted such a possibility to influence our decision in a matter in which truth should be our sole concern. The naturalist, of course, will reject it; he cannot do otherwise. Must the theist also reject it? McTaggart thinks that he must. Such is the obvious implication of the following statement in a letter of December 1898 to Mrs. McTaggart:

> It can't be nice to believe in God I should think. It would be horrible to think that there was anyone who was closer to one than one's friends. I want to feel, and I do feel, that my love for them and the same love that other people have for their friends is the only real thing in the world. I have no room in my life for God, or rather my life is full of God already. I should say, as the Mahometan girl did in Kipling's story, "I bear witness that there is no God save thee, my beloved."[36]

What will the theist say to this? The Founder of Christianity taught that man should love God with all his heart and soul and mind and strength, and his neighbor as himself.[37] McTaggart holds that it is

34. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, secs. 309-10; *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 267-69; *The Nature of Existence*, sec. 460.

35. *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, II, 1, 123-24, 129-30.

36. See G. Lowes Dickinson's *McTaggart*, p. 87.

37. Mark, 12:29-31.

impossible for us to love ourselves,[38] but that is, perhaps, beside the point. It is evident that, for Jesus, God was the supreme object of love, and in this judgment classical theism has concurred. We are told to love the creatures, as it is said, "for God's sake," because he has created them and loves them. And it is frequently implied, and sometimes explicitly affirmed,[39] that we should love them with a love proportionate to their creatureliness, that too great a degree of love would amount to idolatry, to a giving to the creature of that which belongs to God alone.

McTaggart's position is, of course, the very opposite:

> Nothing but perfection could really deserve love. Hence, when it comes in this imperfect world, it only comes in cases in which one is able to disregard the other as he is now—that is, as he really is not—and to care for him as he really is—that is, as he will be.[40]

Thus the experience of love imparts a genuine, although a very inadequate, foretaste of the ultimate consummation. Concerning that consummation, writes McTaggart:

> We know that it is a timeless and endless state of love—love so direct, so intimate, and so powerful that even the deepest mystic rapture gives us but the slightest foretaste of its perfection. We know that then we shall know nothing but our beloved, and those they love, and ourselves as loving them, and that only in this shall we seek and find satisfaction.[41]

Plato, no doubt, would say that the love of persons is well enough in its way, yet that, after all, it is only a rung on the ladder whereby we ascend to the contemplation and love of the Good in itself. From this assertion McTaggart would vigorously dissent. He would say, I feel sure, that such an attitude would infect love with an element of infidelity utterly foreign to its nature. Love, he would insist, is itself our last end, wholly satisfying and all-sufficing. It is ultimate, and there is nothing beyond it.

This evaluation the traditional theist, who sees only in love directed toward God the supreme value, must and will reject. But many a liberal theist will, I believe, do so, if at all, only with a very bad grace. For, as a matter of fact, do not McTaggart's words ring true? Is it not the case

38. *The Nature of Existence,* vol. II, sec. 469.

39. See, for instance, Jonathan Edwards, *Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue,* ch. II.

40. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,* p. 262; *Philosophical Studies,* pp. 225 f.

41. *The Nature of Existence,* II, 479.

that human love at its highest takes all there is of man or woman? Does not the entire personality offer itself with undivided and total devotion? And do we not account it the peculiar glory of our humanity that it is able so to do? Can we find it in our hearts, for instance, to condemn Heloïse for refusing to pretend that she loved God more than she loved Abelard? Do we not really honor her? Must she not have seen in that very imperfect, all too weak and self-centered man, Abelard "as he will be," or as, perhaps, "he really is"; and did not her insight constitute in truth "a strange dash into reality"?

Contrast McTaggart's view with the traditional notion of a God who loves first and best only himself, who has created the world through no need of affection, but for his own glory and to diffuse his goodness, and who requires his creatures to love him more than they love one another. Is such a divine Narcissus a credible being? Can this doctrine escape the charge of inhuman coldness so often brought against otherworldly philosophies—a charge which emphatically fails to attaint McTaggart?

It is, in fact, McTaggart's profound humanity, his loyalty to the best in our nature, that constitutes the great charm of his thought. And for this very reason, I believe that in the long run he will prove a more potent enemy to traditional theism than the naturalist can ever be, precisely because he "works not by denial but by completion." He does not deny, that is to say, the claims and aspirations of personal affections and loyalties; on the contrary, he is concerned to establish their right to posit themselves as our last end. And it is by vindicating their ontological status as the very warp and woof of the Absolute that he seeks to complete the one-sided outlook of conventional otherworldliness through the conception of eternity, not as the negation, but as the consummation of the chief values manifested in time.

Is McTaggart's doctrine of the Beatific Vision capable of being assimilated as a whole or in part by a new theism? This is a question which only the future can answer definitely. The whole problem of theism is once more in the philosophic melting pot, and it is by no means clear as yet in what form it will come forth. I have already suggested that the notion of a non-omnipotent, non-creative God is capable of playing a greater part than McTaggart thought possible. Even if the central self can be looked upon as God only *sub specie temporis,* still his unique position in the universe, *sub specie aeternitatis,* would surely entitle him to be called *primus inter pares.* McTaggart thought the supposi-

tion "horrible" that God could be "closer to one than one's friends." Yet might not the central self also be a friend, to be loved as other friends are loved, with all there is of us, and can man give or God ask for more? Would it not be worth much to have such a friend ever present, never leaving or forsaking us? I shall not attempt to argue here in defense of this suggestion. But I am very sure that, unless the theist can accept McTaggart's evaluation of love and make good his case upon that basis, McTaggart will indeed have vanquished by "completion."

BOOK REVIEWS

Hesiod and Aeschylus. By FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949 viii, 230 pp. $3.00.

In chapters 51-53 of the second book of his histories, Herodotus tells a strange story. The Pelasgians, he says, who lived in Greece before the Greeks, prayed to the gods, but, in the very early times, they knew only of the gods in general and did not distinguish between the individual gods, nor did they know their individual names. Later, however, the Pelasgians learned the names of the gods from the Egyptians, and when the Hellenes or Greeks conquered the country they took over from the Pelasgians the names of the gods which the Pelasgians had learned from the Egyptians. Even then, however, Herodotus continues, for a long time the Greeks did not know where the gods came from or how they looked. This knowledge, in fact, he says, is very young, not older at any rate than four hundred years (at the time of Herodotus, of course). For it was Hesiod and Homer who gave the gods their epithets and were the first to distinguish their ranks and functions and to describe their shape and appearance.

In this passage, then, Herodotus credits Homer and Hesiod with the creation, one is tempted to say of Greek religion, but certainly of nearly everything in Greek religion by which it is distinguished from other religions. Now what Herodotus says about the Egyptian origin of the names of the Greek gods is certainly not correct, and his claim in regard to Hesiod and Homer is unquestionably also exaggerated. Even so, however, is it significant that a Greek writer of the middle of the fifth century B.C. could make such a claim; and there can be hardly any doubt that the importance of Hesiod and Homer—or of the authors of the Homeric poems if they had more than one author—in shaping the notions which the Greeks had of their gods, was very great. It seems, therefore, certainly worth while to make an attempt to find out just what their own contribution was and what they are likely to have taken over from an already existing religious or speculative tradition. In the first half of his present book Professor Solmsen deals with the two great works of Hesiod, the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days,* while in the second half he discusses Aeschylus, who of all the later poets has made the greatest contribution to Greek religious or theological specu-

lation. An intermediate chapter deals with Solon as the representative of the period of transition from Hesiod to Aeschylus.

There is, of course, no full discussion of Homer, who, according to Herodotus, was Hesiod's rival as a creator of Greek religion. But, in the first chapter of his book, Solmsen discusses a number of passages from the so-called *Dios Apate* in the fourteenth book of the *Iliad*, which, because of their cosmological or theological content, show a certain affinity to Hesiod's *Theogony*. In these passages we learn that the Ocean and Tethys are the origin of the world, that the Titans languish in Tartarus together with Kronos, and that, after the defeat of the Titans, Zeus divided the world by lot with his two brothers Poseidon and Hades. Solmsen argues that Homer, because "he goes out of his way in order to introduce these notions or stories," must have invented them. But this argument can hardly be considered as valid. It is possible that the notion of Oceanus and Tethys as the origin of all things, a notion which, in a less mythological form, we later find again in the philosophy of Thales, was first introduced by the author of the *Iliad* or of the *Dios Apate* though this can hardly be proved. In regard to the story of the division of the world between Zeus and his brothers, it can certainly not be said that Homer "goes out of his way" to bring it in. He needs something to emphasize the just indignation of Poseidon at receiving a sharp order from Zeus, and the story of the division of the world which places him on a level of essential equality with his elder brother is admirably suited for this purpose. One would think that this effect must have been stronger if the story as such was already known and accepted than if it was invented for this particular purpose. Above all, however, the allusion to the Titans in the Underworld is so brief that it would have scarcely been understandable to the reader or listener if the fact that the Titans were banished to this place had not been generally known.

But there is still more conclusive evidence to show that Homer or the poet of the *Iliad* did not invent these illustrative stories but took them from a common store of mythological legends and narratives. In the first book of the *Iliad* (396 ff.) we find a story of how one day Hera, Poseidon, and Athene had made a plot to bind Zeus, and how Zeus was saved from this fate only by one of the hundred-armed giants, Briareus, whom Thetis had called to his help. This story is completely inconsistent with the position which Zeus occupies elsewhere in the *Iliad* and specifi-

cally with his relation to Athene. But, at the point where it is told, it serves its purpose very well, for Achilles, who tells it, wishes to show his mother Thetis that she has a strong claim on Zeus's gratitude. At the same time, it is crystal clear that Homer or the author of this passage—even admitting that he could have invented a story so much in contradiction with the rest of the poem, which is most unlikely—cannot possibly have invented the figure of Briareus, much less the hundred-armed giants, just for the purpose of bringing them in here in one single line. We have, then, here conclusive proof that the hundred-armed giants and similar monsters of a crude mythology, who do not fit together very well with the Olympic gods as they appear in Homer, existed before Homer, and if the *Iliad,* as Solmsen assumes, is earlier than Hesiod, before Hesiod also, and that in pre-Homeric times they had individual names and were brought into contact with the Olympic gods. To this extent then, Herodotus is not quite correct. Yet, though what Herodotus said is somewhat exaggerated, there is a good deal of truth in his statement.

It is a rather remarkable fact that the theology, if this term is permissible, i.e., the notions concerning the character and functions of the gods and their relation to destiny, etc. which forms the background of the heroic events described in the Homeric poems, is more consistent than the theology of Hesiod's poems, and this in spite of the fact that Hesiod's poems are assumed to be the work of one man, while the Homeric poems, even if, in the state in which we have them, they are the creation of one author, certainly presuppose a long rhapsodic tradition. The reason of this is clearly that, generally speaking, the Homeric poets selected one of the many types of religious notions which existed side by side in the various parts of the Greek world and in the various strata of the Greek population and developed these kinds of notions further in one direction and towards greater unity, while Hesiod struggled to bring into one system all the various elements of religious beliefs and speculations which he found, adding at the same time new elements that had sprung from his own personal situation and experience.

It is one of Solmsen's great merits to have clearly realized this complex and synthetic character of Hesiod's thought and to have demonstrated that it is quite impossible to eliminate this inherent complexity of his speculation by the assumption that the *Theogony* as we have it

is the work of three, four, or five authors, each successive poet having inserted new verses and new ideas into the work of his predecessor or predecessors. This does not mean that Solmsen rejects the assumption of later interpolations altogether. But, in contrast, for instance, to Jacoby's edition of the *Theogony,* which leaves only a small fraction of that poem to Hesiod as the original author, Solmsen would bracket only comparatively few sections of the poem as either certainly spurious or of doubtful origin.

There remain, however, a number of puzzling problems, the solution of which is rather essential for a full understanding of Hesiod's theological speculation. The Moirai or Fates, for instance, appear in two different places in the genealogy of divine powers, first as fatherless daughters of Night, and then much later as daughters of Zeus and Themis. At the first occasion they are connected with the Keres, usually demons of death, and are said to follow upon the transgressions of gods and men, never relenting in their wrath until they have brought bad visitation on the transgressor. At the second occasion they are given individual names, Lachesis, Klotho, and Atropos, and are said to bring both good and evil to mortal men.

Solmsen himself points out that Hesiod nowhere says that there were two different kinds of Moirai and that, therefore, their presence in two different places of the genealogical chart—quite apart from the difference in the function attributed to them—presents a serious problem. Nevertheless, Solmsen, like other scholars before him, is reluctant to reject either passage as non-Hesiodic. He tries to solve the problem by the assumption that the *Theogony* was not written in a few days or a few weeks, and that the Moirai as daughters of Zeus may represent a late phase of Hesiod's development when he had become less pessimistic in regard to man's fate than he had been at the time when he made them the daughters of Night. There are, however, some further difficulties which Solmsen does not mention. A few lines before the Moirai and Keres appear as daughters of Night, Moros and Ker are mentioned among the fatherless offspring of Night. It seems hardly possible to assume that the Keres in the plural were ever meant to follow upon Ker in the singular as offspring of the same divine power. But there is a much more essential theological problem involved. Moros and Moira are derived from the same stem, which means part or share. The most fundamental idea associated with Moros *or* Moira in the Homeric

poems would seem to be that any mortal being, whether a man or a city or a community, has been allotted a share of life, and that once this share has come to an end, he or it must die. But there is also the idea that a man can bring about his doom beyond fate, i.e., before the time, by starting, through his wickedness or folly, a chain of causation that with necessity will lead to this end. From this there seems to have developed the concept of another kind of Moira, which one might call the conditional Moira, a Moira that functions only if and when someone, out of his own free will, has done a deed that might not have been done. In contrast to the first kind of Moros or Moira which, by its very nature, can apply only to mortal beings, the second Moira applies also to the gods. Thus it is said that *if* Zeus should beget a child with Thetis this child will be stronger than Zeus and dethrone him. But Zeus is wiser than Laios, the father of Oedipus, and does not have a son with Thetis. It is clear that the Moirai as daughters of Night, in Hesiod's *Theogony,* are a moralized version of the second type of Moros or Moira.

At the same time, it is clear that the combination of the Moira of the first with that of the second kind, both of whom, of course, can perfectly well exist side by side with each other, presupposes that, generally speaking, only the ultimate limit of the life of a person is determined outright by Moros or Moira, but that a good deal of the good and the bad that comes to him depends on his own free decisions, while the Moirai as daughters of Zeus, who give both good and evil, seem to presuppose a philosophy of life according to which most of the things—or if the spinning of the thread of our lives by Klotho is given its strictest interpretation, *all* things—that come to us are predetermined by fate.

Thus the problem becomes even more puzzling. Solmsen points out correctly that justice, peacé, and order are dearest to Hesiod's heart, and that there can be hardly any doubt that it was he who elevated them to the rank of gods or divine persons. He also shows that Hesiod is most deeply interested in the consequences of evil deeds and the divine punishment of the transgressor. If this is correct, it would seem that the moralized Moirai as daughters of Night are most likely to be Hesiodic. Yet the Moirai and Keres can hardly have followed on Moros and Ker. W. C. Greene in his book, *Moira,* suggested that there may have been different "recensions" of Hesiod's *Theogony,* meaning obviously that Hesiod in some parts of his work replaced an earlier version by a later one and that, in some cases, both these versions may have been pre-

served in the work as we have it. But, if this assumption is accepted, the question arises why he replaced one version by the other and also which of the two versions is the earlier one. Finally, assuming that some of these versions may have been taken over by Hesiod from an already existing tradition, one may ask how far he was always aware of all its original implications.

This later question becomes even more important when one deals with Hesiod's second great work, the *Works and Days,* for here Hesiod is free from the fetters of theogonic systematisation and brings in only such legends and religious concepts as are relevant to his main theme. Yet, though Hesiod's aim and purpose in bringing in these many stories is usually not difficult to see, many of these stories contain also other elements which fit his purpose less well and seem to be remnants of an earlier tradition. A thorough analysis of these elements, therefore, might make it possible to learn something about pre-Hesiodic Greek religious speculation.

The author of the present book, however, is mainly interested in Hesiod's own contribution and his influence on later Greek religious thought, and in regard to this question he makes an observation which is really of fundamental importance. He points out that, in early Greek religion, a personal insult to an individual god was much surer to call forth divine punishment than a wrong done to another human being. But Hesiod's greatest concern is justice. Solmsen shows how Hesiod solves the problem by making justice itself a personal god and one of the major divinities. This makes it possible for Hesiod to stay within the old concept of the attitude of the gods and yet to make sure that wrong or injustice done to human beings will cause divine retribution.

In the following chapters of his book Solmsen has shown how this Hesiodic innovation has had a very decisive influence on later Greek religious thinking. In Hesiod's own poem the prevailing idea seems to be that wrong-doing will eventually always be punished in this world. In Solon's poems we find the related conviction that wealth and power acquired by unjust means will not last. But there is also a certain scepticism derived from experience which induces Solon to add that sometimes the best intentions and the most sincere effort to do the right and reasonable thing are not crowned by success while, at least for some period of time, the fool and the knave may be favored by luck.

In the last part of his book Professor Solmsen has shown how strongly Aeschylus was influenced by Hesiod. For Aeschylus the Olympic gods and especially Zeus have become the representatives of a higher morality and justice. But, according to Hesiod, Zeus had overthrown his father Kronos by violence just as Kronos had overthrown the rule of his father Uranos. Thus the question arises how a regime that has been established by violence can be lasting and can become a regime of divine justice. This problem, as Solmsen shows, is the background of Aeschylus' Prometheus trilogy.

The same problem though in a different form, appears also in the *Oresteia,* especially in the last play of that trilogy, the *Eumenides.* For here also the Olympic gods establish a new order of justice different from that which is represented by the Erinyes. But, though the Olympic gods do have the power to overcome the old divinities by force, they are not satisfied until they have brought about a reconciliation between the representatives of the old and the new order.

There is one point in this last section of Solmsen's book in regard to which one may perhaps defend a different opinion. Solmsen takes issue with those scholars who have contended that, in contrast to the Erinyes who punish the deed regardless of the circumstances, the Olympic gods consider the motives of its perpetrator. But perhaps it is necessary to make a distinction. It is quite true that neither the Olympic gods nor the Areopagus are interested in the subjective state of mind of Orestes at the time when he slew his mother. They certainly would not, like a modern law court, consider it an extenuating circumstance if he had done the deed in a sudden fit of anger rather than in cold blood. Solmsen also points out quite correctly that Orestes' "conscience" and "impulses," which play such a great role in the interpretations of modern scholars, are not mentioned at all in Aeschylus' play. Yet, even if one agrees with all this, it would still seem to be the most fundamental difference between the Erinyes and the Olympic gods that the former consider only the fact that Orestes has slain his mother, while the latter absolve him or wish him to be absolved because he slew her on the order of Apollo and because she had murdered his father. They would certainly not acquit him merely on the ground that a mother is less closely related to the child than its father if he had slain her for another reason. Thus they clearly consider the motive.

A book dealing with so complex a subject as Hesiod's and Aeschylus' contribution to Greek religion cannot be expected to solve all the problems. But Professor Solmsen's work is an outstanding contribution which deserves the closest study.

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Niṣpannayogāvalī. By MAHĀPANDITA ABHAYĀKARAGUPTA. Edited by BENOYTOSH BHATTACHARYYA. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1949. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, CIX) 86,93 + pp., 3 plates. Rs. 7.

Dr. Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, whose tireless research into problems of Indian Buddhist oconography has already produced a valuable reference work for students of Mahāyāna Buddhism, presents here a rare Sanskrit text on the iconography of Buddhist mandalas.

He explains in the introduction that the original author, Abhayākaragupta, was an Indian Buddhist scholar who lived in the last quarter of the eleventh century and the first quarter of the twelfth, and was connected with the Vikramaśila Monastery in Bihar. This latter fact is especially interesting, as the monastery in question played an important part in re-introducing Buddhism to Tibet after the persecutions of Langdarma had all but extinguished it, and it therefore had a profound influence on the development of Tibetan Buddhism or "Lamaism," which retained many elements of Indian Buddhism—including the extensive use of mandalas—long after these had been wiped out in India. In fact, Dr. Bhattacharyya further tells us that Abhayākaragupta was very active in translating Sanskrit works into Tibetan, and that he may have even gone to Tibet, where he is still greatly revered as having been a Tantric wonder-worker (pp. 10 f.).

There seems to be some confusion in this last statement, however, and we may have a question of mistaken identity, for the Tibetans still keep a high regard for an Indian magician-priest named Abhayākara —not Abhayākaragupta—and he is supposed to have lived at least a century earlier than the dates given here. A conventional portrait of this Indian saint of Tibet, with a brief description of him may be found in J. Hackin, "The Mythology of Lamaism" in *Asiatic Mythology* (London, 1932), p. 173.

After an interesting historical sketch of the Vikramaśila Monastery and the Buddhism of Abhayākaragupta's time, Dr. Bhattacharyya gives a brilliant presentation of the philosophy behind the origin of Buddhist images and the process of deification, citing the relation between Hindu and Buddhist divinities. Then, after discussing the specific iconographic problems presented by the sixteen bodhisattvas, he goes on to list the deities as they occur on the twenty-six mandalas described in the Sanskrit text that follows.

We in this country might naturally wish that Dr. Bhattacharyya, instead of merely reprinting this rare Sanskrit text with an interpretive introduction, had taken a little more time and translated in into English—as he would be so well qualified to do—for the benefit of a larger number of Occidental students of Buddhism. This would have been particularly appreciated by those of us who approach Tibetan Buddhism and its complicated iconography from the Chinese side, and are less equipped to deal with Sanskrit texts in the original. However, Western scholars and museum curators will still find most useful the latter part of the introduction (pp. 33-86) which lists the deities found on the mandalas, even though the comments on them seem excessively brief when compared to the detailed descriptions contained in the text. For now, by referring to the detailed photographs of Lama Buddhist images of most of these figures in Professor Walter Clark's *Two Lamaistic Phantheons* (Harvard-Yenching Monograph Series, vols. III and IV, Cambridge, 1937), it should be possible to identify the majority of the iconographic details on the Tibetan and Mongolian mandalas in our American museums. We have a rich store of mandala paintings in this country, notably at the American Museum of Natural History, Newark Museum, and the Chicago Natural History Museum, offering wide opportunities for research which have thus far scarcely been noticed.

Dr. Bhattacharyya makes much of the interrelation between the deities described in the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* and those pictured in *Two Lamaistic Pantheons,* and he has been most considerate in listing for the student the figures that are common to both. However, in referring to the collection of images found in Peking by Baron von Stael-Holstein, from which Professor Clark's photographs were taken, he makes some strange statements and draws some very questionable conclusions. Failing to realize that the imperial patron who commissioned the cast-

ing of the images was a Manchu Emperor who belonged to the Tibetan Buddhist Church, Dr. Bhattacharyya takes it for granted that he was a Chinese sovereign and that these images represent a profound Indian influence on Chinese Buddhist iconography, which is very far from the truth. His further generalizations on this score, being based on totally false inferences, are historically untenable and should be disregarded.

Useful as his lists of deities on the mandalas can be, they have some shortcomings. For example, in citing the directions on the mandala diagrams, the editor speaks of north, south, east, and west, but then—instead of continuing on with northeast, southeast, southwest and northwest—he uses the names of the Hindu gods who are considered as guardians of these median points (Iśāna, Agni, Nairṛta and Vāyu). This creates the height of confusion when one reaches the twenty-sixth mandala, on which these same Hindu gods, occurring as subordinate figures, are assigned to other directions (pp. 81 f.).

In addition, the lists raise a few minor iconographical questions. For example, on page 81 of the introduction and in the corresponding portion of the text (2nd p. 89), Kuvera is described as being mounted on an elephant; but when he is shown as a deva on the Tibetan Buddhist mandalas, which must have been painted in conformance with this or a related text, his vehicle is always a horse. Thus, either this text is defective at this point, or one must account for some change made by the highly conservative Tibetans, who seldom permit themselves any such liberties with the traditional scriptures.

However the points for objection in this book are comparatively minor and are not sufficient to diminish our gratitude for Dr. Bhattacharyya's service in helping us to find our way a little further into the difficult maze of the iconography of mandalas, about which practically nothing has been written in our language. We can only hope that he will go on to give us still more details, preferably in the form of a full English translation of this text, and that—far more important—he will transmit to us some material on the inner meanings of the mandalas, particularly the esoteric ones, which would give new life to these sacred diagrams and help us to see them as something more than iconographical problems for inquiring Western minds.

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Wittenberg und Byzanz. By Ernst Benz. Marburg am Lahn: Elwert —Gräfe und Unger, 1949. iv, 288 pp. 8 pages of illustrations. DM 16.

Professor Benz was at one time not disposed to challenge the common view that the Reformation had nothing to do with the eastern churches, but the discovery in the cloisters of Mt. Athos of a Russian translation of Arndt's *Wahres Christentum* and of innumerable early Lutheran and Reformed theological writings, not to mention what appeared to be an influence of Dürer on the ikons of the Apocalypse, drove him to inquire whether such relations had their beginnings in the age of the reform. A positive answer was discovered by pursuing the Greek friends of Melanchthon. A systematic investigation of all the leads was precluded by distance and the war, which has cost Benz six years of his academic life. In the meantime, he was able to publish a series of articles in journals, some of which are no longer accessible. To gather up and save these fragments from the debacle appeared eminently wise, particularly since any more systematic approach may well have to be deferred for many a day. This book, then, is a collection of essays extraordinarily illuminating for a neglected phase of Reformation history.

The first section describes the relations of Melanchthon with Antonios Eparchos, a Greek refugee living in Venice, who taxed the Protestant Reformation with having weakened Europe and made possible the advance of the Turk. Soliman the Magnificent was portrayed by this Greek as primarily a religious enthusiast concerned to establish the sway of Muhammad over the inhabited earth. Let Protestants and Catholics defer their differences until political freedom should have been regained. Such a plea was not unwelcome to the emperor, Charles V, who, at Regensburg in 1541, made one last effort to solve the religious problem in order to present a united front against the Turk. The liberals on the Catholic side were led by Contarini and on the Evangelical by Melanchthon. To both of them Eparchos addressed himself, advising Contarini that the dispute over the mass should be dropped in favor of a crusade against Islam, and pleading with Melanchthon as the only man in Europe who could heal the breach to save Protestantism from the reproach of suffering Europe to go under the yoke of the Crescent. Melanchthon replied that the fault lay not with the Evangelicals but rather with the King of France, who had made an unholy alliance with the infidels. A more extensive reply was entrusted to Camerius, who

composed a long treatise in Greek in which he asked whether Melanchthon should address his fellow Germans saying that he had changed his mind and decided to place the things of earth above the things of heaven. Melanchthon himself, however, was realistic enough to face the probability that the lack of a united front might result in the subjugation of Europe to the Turk. Nevertheless, he believed that somehow the Church would survive. The one practical measure to be taken was a strengthening of the bond between the Lutherans and the Calvinists.

The second Greek to approach Melanchthon received a more cordial hearing but ended in utter disaster. Jakobus Heraklides Despota, another exile from the East, drew his religion from Wittenberg and his salary from military service under Charles V. On the emperor's retirement the religious question prevented continued service under his son Philip II, and Jakobus moved by way of Poland, where he imbibed anti-trinitarian leanings, into Moldavia, which he succeeded in conquering with western help in order there to set up a Christian bulwark against the Turks. His friend Melanchthon strongly supported his plan to introduce humanist learning and the reformed religion, though Melanchthon could hardly have been happy over an invitation to Lismanini, the anti-trinitarian of Poland. Jakobus undertook by forcible measures to uproot "superstitutions" of the Greek Orthodox Church: processions, ikons, and the liturgy. He melted down the sacred vessels of the Church to mint coins with his own image. The outcome was a rebellion in which the despot himself fell as an expiatory offering to offended deity. All of which goes to show that the picture sometimes drawn of the Reformation being imposed by the will of the princes is simply unsound. If the people were not convinced, the prince failed.

The third Easterner, for a full half year a guest in the house of Melanchthon, was a Serb by name Demetrios, and a deacon of the patriarch of Constantinople, with whom he undertook to bring Melanchthon into touch. The ensuing correspondence explored grounds for unity on the basis of the consensus of the first five centuries. The Augsburg Confession was translated into Greek and sent to the Patriarch as evidence of the claim that the Protestants took no other ground than this. The life of Demetrios after his delivery of the *Augustana* to the Patriarch has been hitherto unknown, but is here traced by Benz on the basis of newly discovered documents which demonstrate that his further activity was directed to the evangelization of the Balkans. He advised

against a translation of the Bible into the modern Slavic tongue lest it should outrage conservative feeling. Rather, he proposed translations of the catechism and of sermons. He finally joined forces with Jakobus Heraklides and suffered in his fall.

The translation of the Augsburg Confession into Greek in 1559 is astonishing, because it is not a translation of any of the recognized versions. The Latin text by which it was accompanied and on which it was obstensibly based was a free reworking of the *Variata* of 1531. But the Greek translation drew not only from this Latin version but also from the German text of 1530 and, in many fundamental respects, diverged from everything previous in order to recast reformed doctrines not simply in Greek words, but in the thought forms and theological modes of eastern orthodoxy. Legalistic terminology was explained or transformed, and the juridic aspects increasingly prominent in Luther's theory of justification by faith disappeared in favor of the Greek emphasis on expiation, new birth, transfiguration, resurrection with Christ, and the attainment of incorruptibility and immortality. The Augsburg Confession was thus transfigured from the concepts of legalism to the terminology of a mystery cult. Who among the Lutherans was sufficiently informed to do this? And who would dare to take such liberties? The translation came out under the name of Paulus Dolscius, who in the preface set forth the humanist ideal of precise translation which is just what this is not. In any case, would this obscure Lutheran have dared so to tamper with a document which by many had come to be regarded as verbally inspired? Martin Crusius, who was in a position to know, declared that the real author of the translation was none other than Melanchthon himself. He appears to have been assisted by Demetrios, to whom are to be ascribed the reminiscences of the eastern liturgy. The question then arises why the work appeared under a false name, and the answer is that Melanchthon was under too much fire at the moment, whereas Dolscius, being neither a minister nor a theologian, was not so exposed.

The connections of Wittenberg with the Bohemian brethren were kept alive through the mediation of a Wittenberg doctor, the son-in-law of Melanchthon, Casper Peucer, a born Wend and hence acquainted with a Slavic tongue akin to Czech. Hans von Ungnad was the Lutheran apostle to the southern Slavs, that is the Slovaks and the Croats. He was himself a refugee from Austria settled at Urach, and there in collaboration with Trubar and Consul, themselves exiles from Slavic lands, set up in

his own house a printing-press from which to disseminate Protestant works in Slavic translations. The whole enterprise was inspired by an intense missionary enthusiasm in the hope that, after the Slavic dependencies of Turkey had been won, the Ottoman Empire itself might be evangelized. Trubar, following an old eastern tradition, believed that the confusion of tongues at Babel had turned into a blessing at Pentecost, and therefore felt assured of the divine blessing in disseminating the Scriptures in as many vernaculars as possible.

Obviously this book adds quite a new chapter to the history of the Reformation.

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Biblical Criticism and Heresy in Milton. By GEORGE NEWTON CONKLIN. New York: King's Crown Press, 1949. xiv, 137 pp. $2.50.

In this study, George Newton Conklin sets himself to prove that John Milton, in his theological thinking, was completely original, and dependent upon no other sect, heresy, or person. "Milton's positions," he contends, "depended first upon scriptural authority, and this under the guidance of no mortal." His theology was "independently adduced and beholden to none." Milton, to be sure, was familiar with many of the theological writings of his day and of preceding centuries, but Conklin asserts that, in each instance, "the parallels, wherever they occur, (are) merely coincidental."

This thesis is based upon certain statements to be found in Milton's *De Doctrina Christiana:*

> But since it is only to the individual faith of each that the Deity has opened the way of eternal salvation, and as he requires that he who would be saved should have a personal belief of his own, I resolved not to repose on the faith or judgment of others in matters relating to God; but on the one hand, having taken the grounds of my faith from divine revelation alone, and on the other, having neglected nothing which depended on my own industry, I thought fit to scrutinize and ascertain for myself the several points of my religious belief, by the most careful perusal and meditation of the Holy Scriptures themselves. . . .
>
> I deemed it therefore safest and most advisable to compile for myself, by my own labor and study, some original treatise which should be always at hand, derived solely from the word of God itself, and executed with all possible fidelity, seeing that I could have no wish to practice any imposition on myself in such a matter. . . .

> For my own part, I adhere to the Holy Scriptures alone; I follow no other heresy or sect. I had not even read any of the works of heretics, so called, when the mistakes of those who are reckoned for orthodox, and their incautious handling of Scripture, first taught me to agree with their opponents whenever those opponents agreed with Scripture. . . .
>
> This doctrine, therefore, is to be obtained, not from the schools of the philosophers, nor from the laws of man, but from the Holy Scriptures alone, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. . . .
>
> The Scriptures, therefore, partly by reason of their own simplicity, and partly through divine illumination, are plain and perspicuous in all things necessary to salvation, and adapted to the instruction even of the most unlearned, through the medium of diligent and constant reading. . . .
>
> Every believer has a right to interpret the Scriptures for himself, inasmuch as he has the Spirit for his guide, and the mind of Christ is in him; nay, the expositions of the public interpreter can be of no use to him, except so far as they are confirmed by his own conscience.

From these statements, Conklin concludes that "the hermeneutic basis of the *De Doctrina,* Scripture alone under divine guidance, must, as defined by Milton, eliminate any dependence on the doctrinal deductions of theologians, be they patristic, contemporary, or rabbinical." This conclusion, however, does not necessarily follow. Indeed, Conklin gives the case away when he makes the admission that Milton's "speculations . . . were typical of a rational Puritan interpretation of the plain sense of scripture."

George Fox, on the basis of statements similar to those of Milton, was declared by William Penn to be "an original, being no man's copy." Fox repeatedly affirmed that his enlightenment came "without the help of any man, book or writing; for though I read the Scriptures that spake of Christ and of God, yet I knew him not, but by revelation." Elsewhere he wrote: "These things I did not see by the help of any man . . ., but I saw them in the light of the Lord Jesus Christ, and by his immediate spirit and power." All the ideas set forth by Fox, of course, were widely diffused in England during the years of the Civil Wars and the Commonwealth, and for him to have made a claim of originality would have been ridiculous to his contemporaries. What Fox meant by his statements was simply that the validity of these "truths" had been confirmed to him personally by the Spirit. And so it was with John Milton, who looked to the Scriptures as his ultimate authority. He had tried and tested the notions of others by an appeal to "the plain sense of scripture," and thus had made them his own. No longer was he dependent upon

"the faith and judgment of others"; his beliefs were grounded upon the authority of divine revelation as "confirmed by his own conscience."

Quite obviously, John Milton was dependent in his theological beliefs upon other men, notably John Calvin. No one can read his writings without becoming aware of this fact. The typically Puritan insistence upon the necessity of each individual to seek for himself confirmation in the "plain sense of scripture" and to ground his faith thereon did lead Milton to a few unorthodox notions, and of these his doctrines of mortalism and pantheistic materialism may have been more or less original. But such divergencies were quite characteristic of his Puritan contemporaries, many of whom were peddling all manner of strange and novel doctrines. Some were ready to defend episcopacy on a scriptural basis, others presbyterianism, others independency, and still others rejected all existing forms of church government. Some contended for infant baptism and others rejected it. Some held to a strict predestination, others were Arminian, and still others affirmed universal salvation. The list of novel and even eccentric ideas which found expression during this period could be extended almost indefinitely, but two things these mid-seventeenth century Puritans had in common: they all appealed to the plain sense of scripture, insisting that their faith must not rest upon human authority; and they all stood in the Calvinist tradition. Because of their common dependence upon Calvin and his interpreters, the areas of agreement among them were far greater than the minor variations over which they frequently contended so vigorously.

John Milton was a man of his time, subject to and dependent upon contemporary theological thinking, and the attempt to demonstrate his "complete and necessary independence" is quite unrealistic and quite contrary to the truth.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

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The Early Methodist People. By LESLIE F. CHURCH. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949. viii, 286 pp. $4.75.

In this informative and readable work, Dr. Church has succeeded in giving an intimate picture of many aspects of the religious experience of the early English Methodists. His concern is not with the leaders of

British Methodism, whose story has been told and retold by competent writers, but with the great body of the Methodist people, the common folk whose history is not well known, but without whom there would have been no Methodist movement.

In this volume, Dr. Church deals with Wesley's ideal Methodist, the building of chapels, religious experience, fellowship, personal conduct and the family. In a second volume, to be entitled *More about the Early Methodist People*,[1] he promises to discuss the first ventures of the Methodists in social service, the persecutions of the early Methodist ministers, the social classes from which the early Methodists were drawn (more varied than commonly supposed) and their public and private worship. In this manner, he proposes to give a good picture of eighteenth century British Methodist life.

Dr. Church holds that chapel building was forced upon the Methodists not only by the great number of persons who were drawn to Wesley, but also by the variety of Methodist services and activities for which there was no provision in parish church buildings or parish programs.

In the earliest days of Wesley's preaching, fields, private homes, barns, and other places were employed for meetings. Quite soon, Wesley secured the famous Foundery to serve as a permanent place for meetings and as a dwelling for himself and his assistants. This was followed by the City Road Chapel.

Almost from the start the Methodist people experienced serious legal troubles in conducting their services and carrying forward their chapel building program. The Conventicle Act of 1670 forbade such meetings as the Methodists held, and also the use of homes, fields, and similar places for religious purposes. The Toleration Act of 1689 freed Protestant Dissenters from the application of the Conventicle Act, provided they registered their meeting places and preachers according to its terms. Wesley and his followers insisted they were not dissenters and, hence, they were denied the immunities offered by the Toleration Act. Dr. Church makes clear the practical meaning of this in many stories of suffering among the humbler Methodists. He tells of the various solutions, none very satisfactory, which the Methodists tried in their dilemma. Wesley labored to his dying day under this impediment, ever refusing to leave the Church of England to gain easy toleration as a

[1] This work is now published but it has not been seen by this reviewer.

dissenter. The author is troubled that the Church of England did not embrace the pious Methodist people, rather than bring the force of its legal power against them.

In spite of the legal disabilities under which they labored, the Methodists built 626 chapels before Wesley's death and brought the number up to 1540 in the next twenty years. A long chapter tells of this development with much detail and entertaining anecdote. The author describes Wesley's views on chapel architecture and then applauds the marked deviations from them on which the local societies insisted. However, he agrees that Methodist chapels of this period were useful rather than beautiful in design.

Dr. Church is deeply impressed by the spiritual experience of the early Methodist people. He spends much time on two phases of this experience, conversion, and the more advanced state variously called holiness, Christian perfection, perfect love, sanctification, or entire sanctification. His contribution here is a stress on the experimental nature of these steps in the spiritual life. He carefully defines each phase with the use of generous detail from a great number of cases. He emphasizes the identity of individual experiences in spite of the wide range of places, social ranks, and economic conditions represented among Methodists. He also attempts some vindication of the reality of the experiences which he describes, an effort which seems superfluous. Dr. Church's discussion is descriptive and apologetic and shows little use of the contributions which psychology might make to the understanding of his theme.

In his chapter on "Fellowship," Dr. Church professes to see the sense of family as felt within "classes" as a decisive factor in the strength of early Methodism. This reader feels that he has given an excellent picture of the lower level organizational structure, rooted in a common Christian experience, which provided the sinews of the movement. While noting the "Bands," "Select Societies," and "United Societies," he centers his attention on the "Class meeting" and the "Class leader." The "Class" arose from an effort to collect funds needed to conduct the united societies. Its possibilities for detailed public survey and review of the Christian life of individual Methodists quickly became apparent. Soon classes formed a common feature of British Methodism, and all societies were broken into groups of about twelve under class leaders, who in turn were guided by the *Rules of Society* as expounded by John

Wesley. Here again, Dr. Church supplies much detail from the literary remains of relatively unknown Methodists and is able to give the interesting story of one class as recorded in its class book over twenty-seven years.

In his discussion of "Personal conduct," the author describes the well-known moral principles of eighteenth century Methodism and illustrates them with the wealth of detail from common life which is characteristic of this work. Of interest to the modern reader is the difficulty that the Methodist leaders had with the English zeal for participating in "bargains" available when smugglers unloaded cargoes. Often the meeting house would be almost deserted. Wesley's opposition to smuggling was expressed in his *Word to a Smuggler*. Dr. Church also makes some interesting remarks on the use of "Scripture cards." In general, his effort is to see the good and the piety in the Methodists' usually stern ethical positions, but to feel that they were deficient in their knowledge of human nature and of the human need for relaxation and some pleasure. In this book he does not discuss their positive social ethics in detail, this being reserved for *More about the Early Methodist People*.

Dr. Church is very insistent upon the "sense of family" among early Methodists. He attempts to show how, in a life of deliberate religious discipline and precise morality, they achieved a gracious and satisfying home life. He repeats statements of rules of home life and of the ideal itinerant's wife which are forbidding enough, but, in opposition to this, he sets the details of the married life of many Methodists which serve to show how warmth and love surmounted the rigors of the faith. In dealing with parents' attitude toward children, he points, on the one hand, to a normal attitude in many phases of life, but, on the other, to an ignorance of the mind of children which was not always fruitful of good. The Methodist could never get fully away from his conviction that "spiritual condition" was of primary importance, regardless of any other consideration, even infancy and childhood. On the positive side, the Methodists of the eighteenth century did much to promote schools and to extend the newly conceived Sunday schools. Dr. Church feels that much of the error in the Methodist attitude toward children was characteristic of eighteenth century evangelicalism.

Dr. Church's work may be wholeheartedly recommended to those who wish a sympathetic account of early Methodism. It is based on extensive sources not widely available. There are abundant notes and a

full bibliography. He is definitely a Methodist in his writing, and definitely friendly to his denominational forefathers. However, this has not prevented him from giving a precise and full account of the aspects of Methodist life with which he is concerned. He has been very successful in selecting facts and incidents of real interest to illustrate his points. These are well taken and are those of modern liberal Methodism. One leaves this volume with a feeling of having looked closely at an important phase of British church history and with a desire to read *More about the Early Methodist People.*

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The Great Awakening in Nova Scotia, 1776-1809. By MAURICE W. ARMSTRONG, Hartford: The American Society of Church History, 1948. x, 141 pp. xx $2.00.

The phrase "The Great Awakening" calls to mind the remarkable religious revival which swept the American Colonies from 1725 to the opening of the War for Independence, the New England phase of which was inaugurated by Jonathan Edwards at Northampton in 1734 and taken up by George Whitefield, the English revivalist, in 1740-1741. Maurice Armstrong portrays the Great Awakening in Nova Scotia as a transplanting of this New England revival to the Canadian frontier, the Great Awakening being in reality a single movement in which pronounced emphasis was placed upon inner personal religion and direct inspiration. " 'Conviction' or a vivid realization of personal sin and vileness, followed by 'conversion' or an equally vivid realization of God's mercy and favor, the one accompanied by the utmost depression and fear, and the other by unrestrained joy and exaltation of spirit, became the accepted prerequisites of a Christian" (p. 6).

In New England this revival did not prove entirely a blessing, for it divided congregations into pro- and anti-revival parties, and in some cases the pro-revival party withdrew and formed "Separate Churches." Persecution of the latter led to a considerable migration to Nova Scotia, which had finally become a permanent English possession by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Indeed, by the outbreak of the War for Independ-

ence, "New-Englanders" constituted the largest group of English-speaking people in this colony.

In Nova Scotia, difficulty in procuring religious leadership due to the isolated nature of the settlements, the problem of financial support, and the fact that the war robbed many churches of their regular ministers, all led to the development of a native ministry outside of ecclesiastical leadership. A key figure in this development, the person who gave great impetus to the revival movement and became its most prolific writer, was Henry Alline, 1748-1784. For nine years he travelled tirelessly throughout the peninsula preaching a doctrine of experimental religion with extraordinary results—an impassioned preaching which revealed, in Benjamin Rand's words, ". . . a soul in constant communion with those divine realities, by comparison with which the external world became of transitory importance," and which served to implant "in the Nova Scotian character elements of piety and anti-worldliness which have lasted down to the present time" (p. 87). Though often called "The Ravager of the Churches," Henry Alline, the principal character of this study, is here portrayed as, in the words of his epitaph, ". . . a burning and a shining light and justly esteemed the Apostle of Nova Scotia" (p. 86).

The "Newlight" methods and doctrines broke through religious formalism and spiritual lethargy and brought a new devotion and a new morality to pioneer homes. Yet, due to gross methods often employed and lack of stability in teaching, coupled with a deference for "the sensational" rather than "the sound," religious apathy could but follow.

The Loyalist immigration to Nova Scotia at the close of the war, including officials, colonial troops, civilian refugees, and British or foreign regulars, brought new life to the colony. The presence of thirty-one Church of England clergy among the new arrivals, the establishment of the Church of England by law, coupled with large land grants and financial assistance from the English government, the control by the Church of England of the one institution of higher learning in the province, namely, King's College founded in 1790, all seemed to favor a return to an established form of worship, and a triumph for episcopacy. However, the Newlight movement, arising as it did out of the spiritual privations of the early settlements, again came into its own and became the most satisfying and effective religion for this new generation of pioneers. A new wave of "emotional revivalism" swept the country. This

time, however, it became apparent that the inner light was not sufficient in itself, but that respectability, sound judgment, and organization were also necessary; in which case New England Congregationalism became "transformed beyond recognition," Anglicans and Presbyterians suffered losses, while Baptists and Methodists gained much strength.

This is a most admirable study and one that warrants careful reading. Its lack is a final chapter to draw the threads together and state in precise terms what has been the far-reaching and lasting effect of this Great Awakening in Nova Scotia. The question remains: In the larger perspective of Nova Scotian religious history, did this awakening represent some lasting contribution, or was it but a passing stage in the religious growth of a young country on its way to religious maturity?

Basil G. Law

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The Reunion of the Church in South India: A Defense of the South India Scheme. By J. E. Lesslie Newbigin. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1948. pp. 192. $3.00.

The author of this book, formerly a missionary of the Church of Scotland in Conjeeveran and now Bishop of Madura and Ramnad, presents us with a forthright statement of the situation of the Church in South India.

> The missionary movement—itself the result of fresh re-discovery of the Bible and a consequent new movement of the Spirit in the Church—expressed itself mainly in extra-ecclesiastical channels (p. 10).
> The missionary movement of the last two hundred years was the slow, painful and often reluctant obedience of the Churches of the West to the fundamental demand of the Gospel (p. 19).
> The Church in South India has clung stubbornly to the conviction that to have Christ in common is enough (p. 13).

He also says that the divided Church in India had become both an embarrassment to Christians and a scandal (pp. 23, 24.), so much so that the time had come when union had become a necessity. Many agreed, therefore, to pay the price for union, namely the acceptance of the Anglican position on the episcopacy. This acceptance was, then, a matter of expediency. The author insists, also, that "The Church is not pri-

marily an association based upon agreement on theological propositions. It is a unity of persons in the body of Christ, represented locally by congregations in which Christ is present in the midst in Word and Sacraments and through which He reaches out to save the world outside" (p. 182).

In the course of the argument he insists that the various communions which joined in the Union of South India were truly parts of the living Church, and that "the unity of the Church is a reality more deeply founded than the unanimity of a theological school" (p. 186).

> The Scheme (of union) is the result of the actual growth and development of the life of the local church, not of any effort of theological synthesis . . . it is not an essay in theological synthesis, it is a scheme for eccleastical union, the result of a real situation of the Church *vis-à-vis* the world which is in many respects the opposite of the situation in Great Britain (p. 183).

Yet the Union was affected on a theological basis. Bishop Newbigin has given us a closely reasoned theological discussion in justification of it. In this two points stand out, his doctrine of a living Church, and the question of the episcopacy.

The author is fully aware of the situation where the agreement rests upon doctrinal grounds: "The *danger* inherent in all the (necessary) work of theological statement is that *it may go beyond* the task of protecting the Gospel *and become a series of additions to* the Gospel" (p. 16). (The italics are the reviewer's.)

Here he points to a fact that has been slurred over, although it stands out in the settlement. For Bishop Newbigin, reunion is a return to Christ, not to the Church, and rests in the personal, not the theological realm. "The unity of the Church is not intellectual agreement upon doctrines, it is unity in that charity which is given through faith in the Gospel" (p. 106).

He distinguishes "between the Church viewed as a unity in the Spirit constituted by the union of its members with Christ through faith, and the Church viewed as a corporeal unity constituted by the common acceptance of an institutional order and authority" (p. 65). And his insistence is that the latter is not in itself a sufficient ground for determining the validity of union. "When it seeks to find the criterion of its status as a Church in the fact of its continuous institutional existence

it has abandoned the one standing ground that sinners have before God" (p. 66).

It is redemption through Christ that is fundamental. "The Church also in its proper nature is a spiritual and corporeal unity" (p. 66). "We can not without violating the Church's real nature make the sacramental order alone decisive and say that by this the Church is constituted" (p. 69).

> The Christ who makes himself known is not merely the Founder who sent out his first apostles nineteen centuries ago, but the living Lord, our contemporary . . . And . . . the fact of membership in the Church simply regarded as an inspiration does not itself ensure the communion with the living Lord, nor . . . are those who are outside that single, historically continuous institution which is, *ex hypothesi,* the Church necessarily excluded from all communion with him (p. 71).
>
> The whole Christian view of man and of his history seems to me to fall to the ground if there be not in history a movement which is real to God, and if there be not also to history a real end, hoped for but not yet seen, when God's purpose in human history shall have been accomplished (p. 75).

It is this looked for consummation of the Divine purpose that the author emphasizes and calls its (the Church's) eschatological aspect.

The question of what and where is the Church

> can not be answered by examining simply the history of the Church as an institution. This is, however, what is done when it is maintained that the Church only exists where the institutional continuity has been maintained. . . . The Reformation was an appeal beyond the Church as it was to the living God Himself, known in His redeeming work in Christ, and its central emphasis was upon that *fundamentally eschatological* idea, justification by faith (pp. 77, 79). (Italics the reviewer's.)
>
> The denial that non-episcopal ministers are real ministers can only be made on the ground that not continuity in general but episcopacy in particular is of the *esse* of the Church. . . . What is required is that the authority of the bishops to ordain and consecrate is by itself, and apart from the unity and continuity of the whole body, the authority upon which the existence of the Church depends (pp. 82, 83).

Because "The church lives by faith in Christ, and the Word and the Sacraments are the means whereby Christ offers himself to men as the evoker of faith and the creator and recreator of the Church. . . . Its necessary correlate (is) the unity of the whole body" (p. 102).

Consequently, the Church is a growing fellowship both in numbers

and in understanding under the guidance of the Holy Spirit; and "Historical continuity is the fruit of that justifying and sanctifying grace of the eternal God by which the Church lives" (p. 123). "The truth of the Gospel cannot be possessed apart from personal faith in the living Christ" (p. 127).

As noted above, the Union was contingent upon accepting the traditional view of ordination as held by the Anglicans. Here was the old struggle between traditionalism and institutionalism and the *religion* of Jesus. The author calls attention to a fact:

> Every one who has concerned himself with the practical issues of Christian reunion knows the fearful strength of the corporate pride of a denominational group, the terrifying power of group egotism when it has taken into its service memories of great and godly men, scholars, saints and martyrs of the faith" (p. 103).

Its power is clearly effective. And it is this that makes one feel something lacking in this whole matter. Here is the ripe fruit of indoctrination.

As to the arrangement of union,

> In the United Church every ordination of presbyters will be performed by the laying on of hands of the bishop and presbyters, and all consecrations of bishops by the laying on of hands of at least three bishops. Continuity with the historic episcopate is both at the beginning and thereafter to be effectively maintained (p. 107).

At the outset there will be in the United Church a large number of ministers who have not received episcopal ordination, but "it is agreed that the intention and expectation of the uniting churches is that eventually every minister will be an episcopally ordained minister" (p. 119). During the period of thirty years such a variety of ministers will be countenanced, but after that the Church will determine the conditions under which those who are unepiscopally ordained will remain in the United Church. The United Church will be within the historically continuous succession of episcopal ordination and consecration. . . . The great non-episcopal communions, whose traditions are so much bound up with resistance in the name of faith to episcopal claims, *are here accepting not merely episcopacy, but the historic episcopate* (pp. 108, 109). (Italics are the reviewer's.) This is the "price of union." The historic episcopate, in other words, is accepted as that which has been and may be again the organ and expression of the Church's unity (p.

109). The author adds: "Of this union a continuous historical order and a ministry carrying an unbroken authority of the whole Church are the proper expression, but they are not the guarantee" (p. 109).

What seems strange to onlookers is that, in this day, the threat of excommunication is made to Anglicans because of the union by a powerful group of Anglicans. It seems both presumptuous and arrogant, as well as imperialistic, although imperialism here is finished. At the same time, it fails to take into account present-day knowledge of the history of Christianity and New Testament criticism. It is out of touch with the spirit of today and is in conflict with the spirit of Jesus himself. That, in the twentieth century one body of Christians should take upon itself to exclude others from the Church of Christ (even if Rome does) would be absurd even if it were not anti-Christ. Something of this the author notes, but he, too, is a theologian.

When it is proposed to visit the United Church with the penalty of excommunication on the strength of a claim that the sole authority of a ministerial commission derives from Christ in the days of his flesh and not by way of the Church which is his body, we have to reply that this claim can neither be proved from the historical evidence nor reconciled with the credal affirmations of the Church. The ministerial commission is from the living Church in and over the Church which is His body (p. 167).

If South India is to be excommunicated by the Anglican Communion it can only be because that Communion has decided that it can not regard the non-episcopal Churches as part of the universal Church, that apart from the historic episcopate there is no Church (p. 187).

That episcopacy is the sole guarantee of the Church's existence . . . must be rejected (p. 168. See also p. 151).

Still, the author says:

So long as episcopacy is accepted and cherished as the organ of the Church's continuing unity from the Apostles in Palestine to the Christian Church in every land today, it will offer a centre around which the Church may be visibly united. But the claim that episcopacy—by itself and in isolation—is the sole organ of the Church's apostolicity, will be rejected as emphatically by the Great Roman and Eastern Churches as by the non-episcopal (pp. 188 f.).

The author's own position is clear: "To insist on outward and institutional continuity with 'Israel after the flesh' is to contradict the Church's nature" (p. 39).

So much space has been given to the discussion of the doctrine and institution of the episcopacy because it is foremost in the author's

thought and is also the point of issue in working out the Union. One of the results of a study of this volume is the feeling of unreality and artificiality in the whole struggle—the sense of very labored discussion over matters of secondary importance. Many incidents from the Gospel narrative come to mind, reference to one of which will suffice. It is what happened in the house of the Pharisee when a woman broke her flask of perfume over Jesus.

Just how lasting a union so arranged will be is most certainly open to question. Denominationalism has not ceased to make its voice heard in the South, and in other parts of India uncompromising insistence upon non-episcopal or congregational forms of authority is still vocal. Already the hand of the powerful High Church group in England is laid disastrously upon the S.P.G. (Society for the Propagation of the Gospel) work in the United Church. Have the Anglicans overreached themselves?

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

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Toward a Reborn Church. By WALTER MARSHALL HORTON. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949. 120 pp. $1.50.

This book is an excellent brief introduction to the ecumenical movement which is today embodied in The World Council of Churches. It is also an effective argument for a particular conception of what the next steps should be in the sphere of Christian unity and Church union. Professor Horton has long been one of the most catholic theologians in his sympathies. He has found something with which he feels a strong spiritual kinship in all forms of Christianity, from the Eastern Orthodox to the Quakers. But, in his own view of the Church itself, he has always been very decisively on what, for lack of a better term, we may call the "free church" side. Readers will be interested in this book as a good example of how the American "free-churchman" (not a good term, because all American churches are free churches in relation to the state) feels and thinks about the Church. Professor Horton has been very active in the ecumenical movement, and so this book grows out of a long experience of trying to come to terms with the more traditional and hierarchical conceptions of the Church.

This reviewer shares most of Professor Horton's convictions on this

subject, especially his distrust of external forms of continuity in the life of the Church, his rejection of centralized forms of ecclesiastical authority, his preference for a federal form of Church unity, his belief that the ecclesiastical "left," including the Quakers, should play a greater role in the ecumenical movement, his emphasis upon the very great limitations in the "faith and order" approach to Church union. I wish that this book would be taken seriously by European churchmen as a good example of a type of thinking about the Church that is far stronger in America than in Europe.

The first three chapters deal with the history of the three major approaches to Christian unity since the Edinburgh conference in 1912: the missionary movement, with its emphasis upon Christian unity as a by-product; the approach through "Life and Work," with its conferences at Stockholm (1925) and Oxford (1937); and the "Faith and Order" approach represented by the conferences at Lausanne (1927) and Edinburgh (1937). My only serious criticism of the book is that, in its emphasis upon these three approaches, it may fail to suggest to the reader the extent to which something new has appeared in the World Council of Churches. This Council is far from being a mere combination of "Life and Work" and "Faith and Order". It represents a new stage in the experience of Christian unity, new in the depth and pervasiveness of the experience itself, and new in the extent to which Churches are officially committed to the World Council as compared with their commitment to earlier ecumenical institutions. This is all said in the chapter on Amsterdam, but the earlier chapters do not quite prepare for it.

Professor Horton's fear that "Life and Work" may be swamped by the more conservative interests of "Faith and Order" in the World Council seems to me to be without foundation, as most of the activities of the World Council are today closer in spirit to the later developments of "Life and Work." One reason for this is that Churchmen on the European continent are today as much concerned about social and political problems as Churchmen in America. I question Professor Horton's recommendation that "the separate identity of 'Life and Work' should be maintained" (p. 51) to enable Christians who reject the theologized basis of the World Council to have part in it. The relation between the World Council and those Christian bodies that cannot accept its theological basis is a serious question that must be faced, but not at the expense of separating from the World Council most of the activities that

now give it substance. Incidentally, I fully agree with Professor Horton's plea for a revision of the wording of the World Council basis from its present reference to Christ as "God and Saviour" to Christ as "divine Lord and Saviour." Such a change would make many individuals in most of the Churches feel better about the theology of the World Council but it would make little difference in the adherence of denominations to the Council.

Professor Horton's title comes from what he regards as the new emphasis of the Amsterdam Assembly, an emphasis on the rebirth of the Church. It is here that he desires to have the emphasis put today. He proposes the establishment of a chain of centers such as Iona, Sigtuna, Bad Boll, and Bossey in all parts of the world where Christians who are concerned about the rebirth of the Church can experience the kind of personal discipline and renewal that will enable them to be pioneers in the effort to make the Church the mediator of the grace and power of God for the overcoming of the disorder of the world. So far, it is the saving characteristic of the ecumenical movement, even of the official World Council of Churches, that at the center there is deep concern about the reformation of the Church itself. It will be necessary to encourage the kind of groups that concentrate on the reformation of the Church in order to inspire and prod the more conventional organizations of the Church. Certainly Professor Horton's idea that particular centers should be established in America for this purpose is one method that deserves the most favorable kind of experiments.

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Man's Religions. By JOHN B. NOSS. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. 812 pp. $4.50.

This is the first full-length history of religions to appear in America in a number of years. There have been not a few shorter ones, or ones dealing with only a part of the field. But here is one which covers all the great living religions at considerable length, besides discussing primitive religions and the religions of Egypt, Babylonia, Greece, and Rome. This still leaves out a number of faiths which, to be sure, no longer exist, but which do hold some interest for western peoples—the faiths of Europe displaced by Christianity, and a few of the faiths native to the Americas

which had advanced far beyond the "primitive" state before the Europeans arrived and Christianity gradually supplanted them. Really the time has long since passed when in one volume an *adequate* discussion can be given of all the religions in all their phases. Would one do better, therefore, to write less extensively of some, or all, in the interest of being able to treat of all in some degree, recommending to his readers other sources in which they might find valuable additional material, or should he write adequately of only a few of the more representative faiths, trusting that interest will impel the reader to seek knowledge of others through other means? These are questions a writer must answer for himself before he starts out. Some answer it one way, some another.

Mr. Noss says that he had two specific needs in mind: first, that for adequate amounts of descriptive and interpretative matter from the original sources; second, for a presentation that would do justice to the development of the faiths as well as to their origins. The book has as a major aim the bridging of the gap between the founding of the faiths and their present state. Granted the limitations of space—despite the more than 800 pages employed—he succeeded remarkably well in both aims. He has introduced a considerable amount of, on the whole, well chosen original source material. It just isn't possible to include all that should be included. In the end, even including as much as the author has done here, one feels that recourse must be had to still further material which, fortunately, now has been made easily available in a number of excellent anthologies. The writer thinks he has still a better idea which some day he hopes to spring on the unsuspecting world. It is now possible, even in small schools where courses of history of religion are taught, for a teacher to provide carefully prepared reading lists which will lead a student to the original sources in connection with the text he happens to be using. To be sure, it is a great convenience to have it all within the same covers, but it isn't any longer necessary.

Mr. Noss has done a good job in bridging the gap from the beginnings to the present. I know no current book in the field which does it so well or so extensively. This is a great service. Take, for example, the outline of his discussion of Islam. For this his chapter heading reads: "Islam: Monotheism with an Arabian Coloring in Interaction with Various Cultures." It begins with Arabian beliefs and practices before Muhammad, the prophet Muhammad, the creed of Islam. This occupies twenty-seven pages. Then the spread of Islam; the first five centuries of Moslem

thought, which treats successively of the traditions, the early controversies, the rationalists, the traditionalists, the mystics, the synthesis of Ghazzali, and the Shi'ites or legitimists. The final section is "Variations on the Standard Moslem Themes" down to the rise of the new Islamic state, Pakistan. This latter part requires thirty-three pages, or five more than that dealing with origins.

The book is divided into four parts: I. Primitive and bygone religions; II. Religions of India, which, however, includes Buddhist development even in lands outside of India; III. Religions of the Far East; and IV. Religions of the Near East. Part one, including the great religions of Egypt, Babylonia, Greece, and Rome, as well as a rather lengthy treatment of primitive religion, gets 98 pages; part two, just under 200 pages; part three, 150 pages; and part four, 325 pages. Some will quarrel with the space allotment, possibly. The writer believes that the great religions of the past might well rate a larger share. Certainly, if he were using the book as a text for a course, he would feel that he must spend relatively a greater proportion of the period allowed for the whole course than they get in *Man's Religions,* largely because of the tremendous role they have played in the development of the religions of the West. This is undoubtedly a purely personal judgment and reflects only the writer's own interest. Others will feel differently about the matter. The fact that the author of the book is a professor of philosophy has undoubtedly led to a greater emphasis on the development of thought among the various faiths than usual. Another would have stressed the institutions, etc. It is good to have religion treated by men with varying central interests. This enriches the literature of the field, and the work of each serves as a valuable supplement to the treatment of others.

One could easily raise questions here and there as to specific points, e.g., to say that the Way of Works makes its first appearance in the Brahmanas is to overlook much of the material of the Rig Veda which seems to be, par excellence, a manifestation of that way. Ramakrishna, the seer, could hardly be called an intellectual (p. 247). Also, it is not a little strange that no mention is made of the Ramakrishna movement, which is surely one of the very significant modern reform movements in Hinduism; if for no other reason than for its having initiated the missionary phase of Hinduism, it is worthy of mention. One wonders also that no account is taken of the archeological discoveries at Mohenjo-

daro, particularly in the effort to explain the rise of Shiva. But these are of minor importance and may, in most cases, represent only a difference in point of view, or sometimes of the authority on whom one relies.

On the whole it is an excellent book. It will be sure to be used widely as a text and has much to commend it. It should get a wide circulation, and whether used as a text or not, should be extremely useful to all teachers in the field, as a book of easy reference, or, more importantly, of supplementary reading in courses in the history of religion or comparative religion.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

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In Search of a Way of Life. By EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. 97 pp. $1.75.

Singer is among the most experimental-minded of contemporary philosophers. In his earlier books, always characterized by depth of penetration and by beauty of expression, he expounded the implications of his experimental philosophy, showing how nature, life, and mind might be interpreted in empirical terms. In his present book, *In Search of a Way of Life,* he brings the same temper of mind to the analysis of religion. Singer's interest in the nature of religion has been long and persistent. In his *Confessio Philosophi,* he wrote, "Philosophy either is, or else involves, the search for a religion." This search finds a fuller expression in the present book, in which a religion is presented that is at once empirical, rational, and energetic.

Singer begins the discussion by raising the perennial human question, "How should I live if I would get from life the best it has to offer?" To this question his religion gives but one answer: "Either life for an ideal, or—nothing!" To find contentment, he tells us, "subordinate all desires to one, namely, the will to move consistently toward one supreme and ultimate end," and "this end must be regarded as one and the same for all men, of all times." Although this end is actually unattainable, being infinitely remote, it is nevertheless progressively approachable. The life he depicts, therefore, has no prospect of rest, but is rather one of eternal struggle and progress. What, then, is this supreme end or ideal?

For Singer, power is the ideal which fulfills the basic conditions of the religious life, or the life that would know contentment. The deepest and most universal desire of all of us is the "desire for greater power, greater control of events, greater emancipation from fate, heightened probability of achievement, lessened probability of defeat." And as numberless generations, in pursuing this desire, pass their gains on to their successors, "will not the line of these generations, as it lengthens, progress towards an ideal?" And what would that unattainable but progressively approachable ideal be if not absolute power, omnipotence? Singer's supreme ideal, or god, is this omnipotence. Not unlike the divine voice in the *Imitatio,* this god of omnipotence calls to man out of infinity, "My son, I ought to be thy supreme and ultimate end, if thou desire to be truly blessed." This call is convertible for Singer, since one's god is whatever one has chosen as the supreme end of living.

But could some ideal other than omnipotence constitute the godhead of religion? Singer thinks not. And his reason for so believing is the fact that all human desires other than the desire for power change from man to man, from day to day. Nothing else, not even life itself, can be regarded as a desire universal to man. The only universal desire is the one for power or, rather, for more power. And what makes Singer sure of the invariance of this desire for power is that its presence is implied by the definition of volition itself, or by "the criterion that distinguishes the real from the illusory in the domain of desire."

The guiding principle of this religion amounts to this: You should so live the day that every succeeding day will find you stronger than you would have been had you lived it in a different way. There is nothing austere or ascetic about this religion. Any desire is legitimate that does not upon fulfillment reduce the power which one might otherwise have won to fulfill tomorrow's desire. All one must deny oneself is the struggle to win things which if won would weaken one.

But how does one attain power? The major portion of Singer's discussion is an attempt to answer this question by searching for possible sources of power. As an empiricist, Singer rejects help from superhuman sources, whether they be powers of earlier religions or the one Power of present-day religions. The only possible source, luck apart, lies in man. But from what man is this help to come? First, one may get help by helping oneself to more and more science, to more and more knowledge "that is power." Secondly, one may receive help from one's con-

temporaries. This is possible only in a co-operative society, where the gain of one of its members may be used to further the desires of others. Finally, one may find help from one's forerunners. The legacy of courage from the past may renew and strengthen one's spirit. It is, in fact, the function of art to endow us with this legacy as a vital thing, to recreate in us the heroic mood. Thus, the struggle toward the ideal of power depends upon our striving along the paths of science, morals, and art. Without these three, nothing good is possible for humanity; with these three, everything good is possible.

Singer also applies his thesis to dying. For there is not only the question, How is one to live the best life? but the question, How is one to die the least reluctant death? Can one who lives for an unattainable ideal look forward to the endlessness of one's own existence? Singer finds no evidence for this belief in the form it takes in the traditional religions. Nor does he find useful Kant's idea that one should live "as though" one were never to die. For Singer we are all mortal, yet not altogether mortal. There is a type of immortality for us mortals. Future civilizations may preserve the kind of contributions that "humanity is bound always to desire, and which without this finite contribution it must always have lacked." And the one thing that humanity will always desire is "greater power than any given power."

Singer's analysis of religion raises many important issues. One of these concerns the concept of the ideal. Singer's analysis of this concept is significant and rich in implications. Ideals, for him, are limit points, and therefore unattainable though constantly approachable. The pursuit of ideals involves an infinite series of successively attainable objectives. Singer effectively applies his concept of the ideal to various realms of human activity. For science, Nature is such a goal of endeavor. Science approaches its ideal as the error of observation approaches zero. Nature, therefore, is "completed science," and "science is Nature in the making." For morals, world-long *progressive civilization* is similarly subject to ultimate unattainability. Ideals, for Singer, go beyond psychological and social contexts; they also do not reside in the realm of Platonic Ideas. In many respects they are akin to Kant's Ideas of the reason, having a regulative and limiting function in experience.

Another important issue is whether the ideal of power should be, as Singer argues, the only supreme object of devotion. Singer presents a striking analysis of the idea of power and of its different sources. He is

wholly convincing in his argument that, in the kind of world we live in, power, as he defines it, is the only way of attaining our desires. It should, of course, be mentioned here that, for Singer, power as the supreme end is not to be identified with the love of the will-to-power as we find it in the Nietzschean heroes—his co-operative community rejects such overpowering spirits; he argues, rather, for the fact that it is only through power that our desires can become real attainments instead of remaining mere illusory hopes. But even in this modified form should the ideal of power be the sole object of worship? If one accepts Singer's conditions for the religious life, which he states in the first pages of his book, his claim for power as the supreme end seems inevitable. But are these conditions, especially the second one—namely, that the ultimate end of life "must be regarded as one and the same for all men"—unarguable? Within the framework of Singer's experimental philosophy it may be possible and sometimes even desirable to develop a philosophy of religion that is more pluralistic, one that would allow a variety of supreme ideals.

Yet another significant issue is involved in Singer's discussion of art as a source of power. His analysis of art is the most original part of the book. The interpretation of art in terms of mood, the characterizing of this mood as "heroic," and the basing of this heroic mood on the theory of recapitulation—all these things make exciting and illuminating reading. But he deprives his readers of what his idea of progress might mean as applied to aesthetic experience. Since he had so fruitfully applied the idea of progress to science and morals, one naturally looks for its application to art.

One other point. Singer's whole analysis of religion is based primarily upon his acceptance of a certain method of getting our beliefs. For Singer the question of method is the deepest issue "that can divide man from man in any domain of thought." He has committed himself to experimentalism. As a deeply religious philosopher he puts "the secular behind him," but as an experimentalist he closes "the doors of faith before him." Many should be grateful to Singer for having dealt with religion in this spirit, for having placed it in the framework of science and thus made it relevant to contemporary life. The belief in experimentalism has been questioned by supernaturalists, mystics, irrationalists, and rationalists. Those not acquainted with Singer's general philosophy would have liked to know some of his reasons for

affirming that "questions leading to no thinkable experiment lead nowhere." But very likely a discussion of the problems involved here would have led him into technical analysis and thus would have partly defeated the primary purpose of his book. And, in any case, he has discussed some of the questions of methodology in his earlier books, and many of us hope to see soon the fuller statement of his experimentalism which his next book, *Reflection and Experience,* promises to give.

In Search of a Way of Life is a thoroughly modern book, yet fused with the great values of the past. Singer effectively integrates major life-values in the framework of science. Many of those who have discarded the traditional beliefs, but who wish to arrive at some tenable attitude toward life, will find this book a real guide. What impresses one when reading Singer's analysis of religion is his uncompromising experimentalism and genuine humanism, and the elegance and originality with which he expresses them.

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God's Grace and Man's Hope. By Daniel D. Williams. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949. 214 pp. $2.75.

Recent discussion reveals that American Protestant theology is moving into a new stage. Whether the new stage is called "neo-liberalism" or "post-neo-orthodoxy" depends on the orientation from which one is moving; both words are as legitimate as they are cumbersome and misleading. Indeed, one positive insight gained from recent discussion is that theological labels are still as confusing as most other labels. As Professor Williams suggests in this volume, the "neo-orthodox" theologians are, for the most part, liberals who decided liberalism had not gone all the way in relating biblical truth to contemporary thought and action; they have much more in common with liberalism than with fundamentalist orthodoxy, and thus they are as truly neo-liberal as neo-orthodox. Similarly, a younger generation of theologians would now point to the excesses and weaknesses in both liberalism and neo-orthodoxy in the interest of a more balanced and productive liberalism (or orthodoxy?).

Enough to suggest that the labels do not matter. Professor Williams, a thoughtful spokesman for the emergent middle-of-the-roaders who

have converged from both the right and the left, affirms the values of liberalism thus: "To bring human culture and social advance into one religious unity, with a clear ethical imperative and sustaining hope was the supreme achievement of the liberal Christian mind. . . . The prophetic element in the theologies which today criticize liberalism are in part dependent on the liberal achievement" (p. 25). This statement is buttressed by quotations from mature liberals which show that they are not guilty of the simple optimism and naïve faith in automatic progress of which they are frequently accused. Nevertheless, the neo-orthodox theologians (and Professor Williams lumps together in this category a number of men who differ sharply among themselves) are justified in most of their criticisms of typical liberal shortcomings. The liberals do not, on the whole, face squarely the tragic elements of human experience and the subtle devices which men employ for self-justification and corruption of lofty personal and social ideals and programs. Their Utopias are too much of this world, and they are too frequently merely harmless as doves because less wise than serpents. Being rationalists at heart, they cannot admit those tragic dimensions of life which can only be expressed mythically.

On the other hand, the neo-orthodox theologians turn out to be "inverted romanticists." Clinging to the simon-pure goals of liberalism but chastened and disillusioned about the possibility of realizing these goals "in history," they project the goals "beyond history" and either let history shift for itself with its age-old "orders" or use the flying goals "beyond history" for historical criticism. In either case, a sharp distinction between the human and the divine, the temporal and the eternal, is necessary. The resultant theology is transcendentalist, ethically and metaphysically. The metaphysical transcendentalism is usually couched in the classical concepts of static "being," so that "to be" is divine and "to become" is human, and the "now" of the eternal is discontinuous with natural duration. Ethically, such metaphysics leads to the equating of temporal conflict with sin. Similarly, the radical distinction between the personal-divine and impersonal-secular posited in the thought of men like Brunner leads to a depreciation of the role of impersonal imperatives and structures in those social processes which make persons possible. Finally, having posed the dilemma of temporal man in impersonal conflict over against the ideal of an eternal community of mutually enriching persons, the neo-orthodox theolo-

gians offer the Christian promise that the sinfulness of man which creates the dilemma may, through God's grace, be overcome—but only "in principle" and not "in fact" so far as "this world" is concerned.

It is Professor Williams' thesis that the neo-orthodox theologians' criticisms of liberalism are justified, but that their alternatives as outlined above sacrifice valid and valuable Christian insights and thus vitiate Christian action. Some conflict is creative; some impersonal structures are necessary for the development of persons; Christian revelation entails a "break" in or "invasion" of time, but there is also such a thing as growth in grace; and, whereas the overcoming of sin does not lead to sinlessness, if the victory is literally won only "in principle" and not to *any* extent "in fact," then "the whole of Christian experience is a delusion" (p. 38).

Professor Williams would show us a more excellent way in a theology which takes more seriously the doctrine of God as Redeemer as well as Creator and Judge, a theology commensurate with a metaphysic of process rather than a metaphysic of being. The opposed shortcomings of liberalism and neo-orthodoxy alike are traceable to the fact that both have left out "the very basis of Christian experience—God's redemptive work in human history." This redemptive work is seen in the continuous destruction of evil (the self-defeat of disruptive processes); in the transformation of some evil and loss into new good through deepened insight; in the experience of forgiveness when sin is admitted; and in the "treasuring of the passing goods of life, as each passing event gives itself to and becomes a part of the ongoing movement of life, and as every moment of time finds its particular niche in eternity . . . in the 'abidingness' of God" (p. 56). But Who or What is God, and what is meant by His or Its "abidingness"? "God is the reality in and through all things which makes possible the response of life to the lure of the fulfillment beyond the present" (p. 52). These words, reminiscent of Whitehead, Hartshorne, *et al.*, are not to be construed to mean that God is simply the whole process of life; to make such an equation is "to ignore the fact of evil." God is the Ground of Good, then, a Ground-in-process or Ground-of-process; and that which opposes Him and makes the process-struggle real is apparently either groundless or simply unaccounted for. The question then occurs: What is gained if evil is not ignored but also not accounted for? Again, the

process-God idea is supposed to help us avoid the neo-orthodox error of making deity so transcendent as to be irrelevant at certain crucial points; but when we ask whether the process-God is transcendent or immanent we get an equivocal answer. Epistemologically, we are told, God is transcendent in that no man can know all that He is; ethically, He is transcendent in that no man or society can achieve all of His good; but metaphysically He is transcendent only in that "He does not depend on *any particular creatures* for His own being" (p. 44, italics mine). And as for God's "abidingness," which is the locus of the conservation of values and apparently the equivalent of eternal life, we are told that the "time-structure of the interweaving of processes," "the order characterizing the flow of processes," is "duration." The neo-orthodox categories of *Kairos* as contrasted with *Chronos* are merely abstraction from the full reality of duration, *Kairos* consisting of the abstracted elements of meaning, valuation, purpose, and expectation (p. 128). But whether "the abidingness of God" is the same as "duration" in general or is restricted to the duration of such good as is generated in process—which restriction would seem to be demanded by the ethical and cosmological positions stated above—is not clear to this reader. All of which leads one to wonder whether the language of process-philosophy is any less ambiguous than that of the old-fashioned varieties when the attempt is made to use metaphysical terms to express that which theological language expresses in a more consciously poetic idiom.

Be that as it may, Professor Williams is convinced that the interests of The Kingdom of God—"a universal community . . . in which each member is more free, more mature, more powerful through what he gives to and receives from each other member" (p. 79)—will be better served by a theology which preserves some historical relevance for Christian hope through a positively elaborated doctrine of redemption, personal and social. He even suggests that such a theology might provide a new emphasis on the Christian symbol of "the embattled Christ" (p. 130). With his basic thesis many will agree, whatever their present orientation may be, and in his critically constructive Rauschenbush Lectures, Professor Williams has made a notable and valuable contribution to contemporary theological inquiry.

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Christianity and Fear. By Oscar Pfister. Translated by W. H. Johnston. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. 589 pp. $6.50.

It is a curious fact that this profound study by the Swiss Protestant pastor and psychoanalyst, Oscar Pfister, should be arriving in America as late as five years after its original publication. Indeed, it would seem that Pfister's work as an analyst and collaborator with Freud is much better known in America than his contributions to the field of Christian psychotherapy. Even so, his publications in German have been numerous, and one could confidently predict that this volume will stimulate a lively interest in the author's previous work.

This volume is subtitled "A Study in History and in the Psychology and Hygiene of Religion." Its sections comprise three parts: (1) the theory of fear; (2) a historical section on the solution and formation of fear in the history of Judaeo-Christian religion; and (3) the hygiene of religion, or the fundamental solution of the problem of fear through Christianity. In Pfister's own words, it is "the results of 36 years of study dealing with the nature and history of Christian love as applied to a single but exceedingly important problem, that of fear." The student of psychology and religion will find here a wealth of information which, to my knowledge, has been brought together in no other place.

An immediate problem is that the German *Angst* is translated as *fear* and *Furcht* is translated as *dread,* which contradicts the usual English distinction between *fear* as being motivated by an external danger and anxiety (or dread) as being without external threat.

Although Pfister mentions a third form of fear in which *Angst* and *Furcht* are mixed, he actually has no place in his view for what Kierkegaard and other Christian theologians would call the anxiety of existence—man's position of contingency as a finite creature between essence and existence. Throughout the book, *Angst* is defined as an inhibition of love caused by the "damnings of primary, of moral or of religious love as well as inhibitions of self-love, love of others and love of God" (p. 52). *Angst* is, therefore, pathological fear in which scrupulosity, fear-determined fantasies, and rationalizations originate from its deep-seated cause in guilt feelings.

It should be added, however, that the author does not look to the complete elimination of fear. "What matters," he writes, "is whether the struggle to ward off fear ends in victory or defeat" (p. 109). Hence, in

contrast to the medical view, it is possible to assume that "normal" fear plays a positive role when it stimulates man in the direction of great works in science, morality, and religion. He adds, "The loftiest and most splendid experiences of religion are frequently forms of relief. This does not affect their value in the least degree."

Through *Angst* the simplest practices of religion become compulsive neurotic rituals, and Pfister seems inclined to relegate much Christian ritual and symbolism to this category. For him they operate on the level of *Angst* compulsion almost entirely.

It would seem to this reviewer that Pfister regards symbols almost entirely as secondary, that for him the symbol as sustaining an intrinsic relation between the experience and the manner of its expression is unknown. There is a bias against myth, symbol, and ritual throughout this book which seems singularly undynamic, especially as it comes from the pen of a depth psychologist. If we grant that compulsive rituals constitute a continuing problem for positive religion, it does not follow that ritual (and symbol) can not be the bearers of love and reconciliation, which, indeed, they have been in many instances in Christian history, apparently undiscovered by Oscar Pfister.

The methodical thoroughness of this book should make it very useful as a textbook in teaching Christian psychotherapy. At many points the author demonstrates an incisive understanding of neurotic development and relief. A case in point is the introduction of the term *insessions* in contrast to *obsessions* to identify the "fantasies, feelings and actions which are genetically and spiritually identical (with obsessions) but are produced freely by the ego" and, thus, as a part of the ego are not felt as compulsions. Again, its thoroughness is demonstrated in the repeated warnings that there is no "standard" solution for fear as there are no "standard" individuals.

Pfister points to the striking similarity between the "crowd-man" and the compulsive neurotic. Both are dominated by the needs of the unconscious and, in both cases, their means of expression are improvised and transitory and unsatisfying. On the other hand, a community is an organized group which "endeavors jointly to overcome the fear and distress arising from isolation, horde-formation and crowd-formation and to produce positive values; in this process it endeavors to preserve personal thought, feeling, volition, freedom and decision in the ethical and religious spheres and to allow the individual to share in

government" (p. 144). The tragedy of Christian history in Pfister's terms is that the Church has too often been a "Crowd" rather than a "Community."

The application of the single criterion of the solution and formulation of fear leads Pfister to some interesting conclusions in his historical section. This enormous section (339 pages) moves from a Freudian interpretation of primitive worship (in which the image of the father appears in a sublimated and idealized form) through the major phases of Hebrew-Christian history. Despite the prophets and numerous efforts at reform, the tendency of the Old Testament is in the direction of crowd formation through orthodoxy and ritual. On the other hand, the "peculiar essence" of Jesus, as demonstrated in his central ideas, acts, and words, flow from an unbounding love which he had experienced "within himself as the supreme revelation, certitude and imperative of God."

While the competence of Pfister seems unquestioned in the area of psychology, his interpretations in other fields may be open to many questions. For Jesus, moral action experienced as the love of God rather than obedience to doctrine and ritual is the basis of salvation. But the Church, following St. Paul, has "obscured, distorted and attempted to refute this fundamental fact and in so doing has done incalculable harm to the development of Christian piety" (p. 190). Indeed, Pfister is adament in claiming that "Jesus was no Paulenist," and he deplores the fact that "in the issue between Jesus and St. Paul the Christian Church decided in the main in favour of the latter" (p. 220). Perhaps the work of C. H. Dodd and other scholars has failed to disprove that there is an issue, but certainly the most that can be claimed as an issue between the synoptists and the apostle is that the former give the picture on which the statement, "Jesus is the Christ," is based, while the latter explores its meaning for man in existence. It would seem that Pfister reads more into this issue because of his fundamental view that St. Paul distorted the essential picture of Jesus.

A distracting problem in following Pfister's subsequent analysis of early Christianity, Catholicism, and the Reformers is his assumption that autonomy as opposed to heteronomy is a simple possibility when fear is removed. Pfister is dismayed, as I am sure his readers will be, at the lack of love and the practice of sadistic persecution by Christians—Catholic and Protestant. But these tragic instances fail to suggest the

ultimate tragic character of history. The "good news" for that vast number of people for whom unloving factors continue to operate throughout life, is that their love fails to measure up to that displayed by Jesus. It is hardly surprising to find that Pfister regards both Catholic and Lutheran sacraments as magic instruments of repression and that "in Luther the 'Christ for us' becomes a 'Christ in us' representing a resuscitation of St. Paul's mystical view of Christ." Calvin made of God a "compulsive neurotic." The Enlightenment brought relief by the restoration of love in the widest sense, but the "exceedingly kind" God of the Age of Reason lacked the power to elicit the ardor which risks all for God.

Christianity and Fear is a study of vast proportions for the Christian Community. What it may lack in theological depth it compensates for in the area of psychological competence and in conviction. That conviction, that, through the optimum realization of love, the Christian faith must become a "sacred medicine" enriched by scientific, medical, and sociological discoveries which relate the individual and the community, is a demonstrated fact in these pages. It is a valuable contribution to our literature of psychology and religion.

C. R. Stinnette, Jr.

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CRITICAL COMMENTS

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR TSELOS

I have read Professor Tselos' review of my book, *Sacred Fortress,* in the March, 1950, number of your journal with interest and profit. His criticism of my main thesis, if I understand him correctly, is two-fold: First, that my interpretation of the Ravenna mosaics, based mainly on literary sources, "is destined to remain in large part conjectural." I don't see how I could take exception to this statement. If I have presented, in my book, as incontrovertibly certain what is merely hypothetical, I have done so inadvertently and I welcome Professor Tselos' words of caution.

The reviewer's second and main point is that, in relying on textual evidence, I have "ignored the alternative and supplementary explanation" offered by "an artistic lineage independent of contemporary texts." As Professor Tselos recognizes, my book is concerned with the political significance of the Ravenna mosaics. I have tried to show that they were conceived of as part of a great political design, and that they were meant to evoke the religious "myth" upon which the political structure of the Byzantine Empire rested. I have focused my interpretation of the mosaics on this function rather than on their place in the history of art, the latter project being a task which I hope to undertake in the future. I think the limitation of my present analysis was a necessity imposed by the nature of the subject, but I don't think that the historical and documentary evidence on which my argument is based will be refuted by the testimony of the monuments themselves. Professor Tselos thinks otherwise; but the arguments he advances have not convinced me, and they contain several errors of fact or interpretation which, for the benefit of readers, it seems necessary to correct.

Professor Tselos focuses his criticism mainly on my interpretation of the San Vitale mosaics. With reference to the apsical composition, he writes: "Mr. von Simson's interpretation of the presence of Ecclesius (p. 24) is as follows: Ecclesius had to be honored as the founder of the church, but since he had been a friend of Theodoric and Pope John, he was not worthy of being represented with the Emperor, whose company was reserved by Maximianus for himself. Consequently he was placed in the apse with the Lord and St. Vitalis." He adds, "I confess that the motives imputed to 'Byzantium'—really Maximianus—appear strange and tenuous." I agree with the last statement. The interpretation imputed to me would be historically absurd; neither on page 24 nor elsewhere have I advanced or even hinted at it. In the passage referred to by the reviewer, I suggest that the apotheosis of Ecclesius represents an iconographic type as likely, or more likely, for a deceased person than for a living one. But this suggestion is but a relatively insignificant part of an argument—too complex to be repeated here—which has led me and other scholars to assume that the execution of the mosaics during Ecclesius' lifetime is very much less likely than execution after his death and during the lifetime of Maximianus.

Professor Tselos has similarly misquoted me with reference to the representation of the Four Evangelists: "Mr. von Simson (he writes) thinks that . . . the juxtaposition of the evangelists over the prophets is in accordance with the Eastern parallelism of the two dispensations as shown in the *Christian Topography* of Cosmas Indicopleustes. These are interesting observations, but they hardly prove the Eastern inspiration of the evangelists and their symbols." I have nowhere implied such Eastern inspiration. After enumerating the Western representations of the apocalyptic *Zodia,* I adduce the Roman (!) ceremony *in apertione aurium* as a literary parallel for the liturgical context in which the evangelists are evoked. And I have quoted Comas Indicopleustes not because, as Mr. Tselos puts it, "the juxtaposition of the evangelists over the prophets is in accordance with the Eastern parallelism of the two dispensations," but because the *Christian Topography* which is contemporary with the San Vitale mosaics gives "an excellent idea of the prevailing religious and intellectual preoccupation of the sixth century."

The point Professor Tselos is actually trying to prove is that the San Vitale compositions depend stylistically and iconographically on Rome rather than Byzantium. His argument appears to me at least as conjectural as any I have advanced. With reference to the Lamb of God in the vault, he remarks, "It is strange that the representation of the Agnus Dei is unknown in East Christian monuments, whereas it is a common feature in West Christian works." To presuppose Western derivation just because we do not know Eastern antecedents is an uncertain undertaking, in view of the fact that so very few pre-iconoclastic paintings of the Christian East have survived. But Professor Tselos is wrong, even within the narrow scope of the monuments still in existence: the Lamb of God raised on a disc held by angels (the same representation as that in San Vitale) appears in the sixth century murals on the vault in the church of Perustica in Thrace, the important monument which, according to M. Grabar, is intimately related to the art of Constantinople itself.

The attempt to distinguish neatly between "Eastern" and "Western" Christian art must always be hypothetical in view of the dearth of existing Eastern monuments. Since the age of Theodosius the Great, at least, the increasingly powerful influence of the official art of Byzantium renders such distinction more and more meaningless. (Even the mosaic in S. Constanza which Mr. Tselos adduces as the prototype of that in San Vitale reflects the ritual and imagery of the imperial court.) The mosaicists of Ravenna, like the architects, may well have drawn their inspiration for individual motifs from Western prototypes: the ideas they convey are those of the imperial court. It is this fact that has led me to suggest that the program was fixed in Byzantium.

Otto G. von Simson

BOOK NOTES

Srimad-Bhagavad-Gita. Translation of the Text and the Gloss of Sridhara Swami. By Swami Vireshvarananda. Mylapore, Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1948. vii, 536 pp. Rs. 7.

Sridhara Swami's interpretation of the *Gītā*, with his translation, was made about six hundred years ago. His chosen deity was the Man-Lion incarnation of Vishnu. Though the author was an advaitin of the Shankara School, in his interpretation of the *Gītā* he leaned towards devotion as opposed to knowledge. For this reason his work was refused acceptance as authoritative. Later, however, the book was given divine sanction in Benares by revelation or vision. The translator's work is very well done.

George W. Briggs

Buddhi Yoga of the Bhagavad Gita, or, The Basic Science of the Soul. By Magdal Ramachandra. Bangalore City: Subodha Press, 1948. viii, 62, 248, 56 pp. Rs. 4/8.

The author furnishes an English translation of the *Gītā*, together with an introduction and a running commentary, to show that the distinctive teaching of the *Gītā* is the philosophy of *buddhi yoga*, distinct and different from that of the *Mahābhārata*, in which it is embedded. The *Gītā* has its own original viewpoint. Its age is suggested in the form of a question as 5,000 years, and it existed long before the Epic. It makes no express reference to the Upanishads. The various schools of philosophy interpreting it, each for itself, do not (any one of them) understand it. All the technical terms common to traditional Hindu thought are used with a special connotation in this system, a fact mostly overlooked by students of the *Gītā*. But the author holds the key.

In expounding this philosophy of *buddhi yoga*, he consistently supplies in parentheses the word *buddhi* before *yoga* in his translation. *This* is the system which Lord Krishna taught to Arjuna, in which the human problem is set forth from the point of view of the Creator. It postulates a personal God. What Arjuna (man) should understand is that the Purushottama is the Overlord of creation. Krishna is the supreme Soul *principle*. He transforms himself into Purushottama (the Supreme Enjoyer and Overlord) by his absolute desire *(Māyā)* and by his inherent power to do so. Krishna, through Brahma, projects the empirical universe for his own enjoyment. The individual is a mere means for Krishna's enjoyment. Man performs his appointed actions for just this reason. This is clear from the Eleventh Chapter, where Krishna reveals his supreme form to Arjuna.

"Renunciation *(tyaga)* means . . . not so much the refusal of the fruits (of karma) as its acceptance in a particular attitude. The Supreme, who is Overlord, presides over all fruits of action; and he ordains the fruits of actions to all men as he deems fit. Whether this is agreeable or disagreeable, one should accept it because he wills it to be so (p. 44). *Buddhi yoga* is skill in all actions from this

point of view. "In this state the doer not only renounces the fruit but even his ego-sense in doing action. This utter absence of the ego-sense in doing actions is what the Gita means by giving up Kamya-Karma. This is the Sanyasa spoken of in the Gita" (p. 219). Thus, "he will be the tool in the hands of that Supreme will, the fifth cause, Daiva, which has decreed the event and assumes the responsibility for it" (p. 225). "Sri Krishna says here (18.56) in effect, that to know him as the Enjoyer, the Overlord and Supreme Ruler of creation, which is to know him in 'principle,' is the right way to know him. Without this awakening to the principle, devotion however tense will be irregular and ineffective" (p. 234).

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

Hammer on the Rock, a Short Midrash Reader. Edited by NAHUM N. GLATZER. New York, Schocken Books, 1948. 128 pp. $1.50.

The wisdom and variety of these selections from the Midrash and kindred materials from the Talmud is overwhelming. It is, in a way, unfortunate that everything included here is of a narrative and homiletical character; one feels the need to see how legal materials manifest this wisdom. The spirit of the Rabbis, despite preoccupation with the word of God, is akin to that of modern humanism. "The Torah has already been given once and for all from Mount Sinai; we do not listen to voices from heaven" (p. 97). God has said what he has to say; now it is up to man to interpret it, democratically, according to the decision of the greater number of experts, for, "After the majority must one incline."

Yet it is not humanism, for this apparent arrogance is but a paradoxical expression of the Rabbis' striving for humility. The thought runs to paradox: "Everything is foreseen and everything is laid bare yet everything is in accordance with the will of man" (p. 23). "Everything is foreseen, yet freedom of choice is given; the world is judged with goodness, yet all is in accordance with the amount of good" (p. 116). Indeed, is not the very existence of the Jew the supreme paradox of history? "Every distress that Israel and the nations of the world share is a distress indeed. Every distress that is Israel's alone is no distress" (p. 38). Why, then, should there not be this paradox of the arrogance of the Rabbis in the face of the Almighty and their humility in the face of His creatures? "Much have I learned from my masters, and more from my comrades than from my masters, and from my disciples the most" (p. 53).

It is pleasant to meet old friends so well-dressed, thanks to Dr. Glatzer and Schocken Books.

J.L.B.

Das Gottesreich bei Lukas: Eine Studie zu Luk. 17:20-24. By BENT NOACK. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1948. 50 pp. Kr. 2:50.

This is number 10 of the "Symbolae Biblicae Upsaliensis," which supplements the *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok*. It begins with a survey of the whole history

of the exegesis of Luke 17:20-24 ("the Kingdom of God cometh not with observation") from the earliest textual variants and translations down to present day commentaries, and concludes with a discussion of the passage in the context of Luke's general view of the Kingdom of God. The author holds that Luke himself understood the passage to mean: There is no need to look forward to the Kingdom's coming, or to inquire whether it is to be found here or there, since it is already "in your midst"—Jesus the King is already present, therefore the Kingdom is also here. But a time is coming when the King will be absent (the period between the crucifixion and the Parousia), and then the Kingdom cannot be seen. You will then long for a single day of the coming reign of the Son of Man, but you will not experience it. But do not go here and there looking for it; for when the Son of Man appears he will shine forth like lightning from one end of heaven to the other.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Interpretation of the Revelation of St. John the Divine. By APOSTOLOS MAKRAKIS. Translated by A. E. ALEXANDER. Chicago: Hellenic Christian Educational Society, 1948. xii, 552 pp. $5.00.

This is not a work of philological or historical criticism but a piece of theological speculation. It presumably contains the eschatological section of a larger system of theology. Its translation by a professor of English at Northwestern State College is a personal tribute to the author by a warm admirer of his ideas. In America these ideas would appeal primarily to Protestant fundamentalists, and no one would have been surprised had they emerged from one of the Russian evangelical sects (see R. P. Casey, *Religion in Russia,* p. 39). In Greece, however, Makrakis appears curiously without religious context. This impression of spiritual isolation, unredeemed by considerable originality of mind, no doubt explains his stormy and contentious career. The School of Reason *(logos)* which he founded in Athens was closed by the authorities in 1878, and until 1881 he was in and out of the courts on charges of heresy and other more mundane counts and spent some time in prison. After his release he wrote a number of books expounding his philosophy and theology and made ten provincial tours as a revivalist, preaching to large congregations in the open air. At his death permission was obtained to hold his funeral in the Cathedral at Athens, a remarkable concession in view of his frequent encounters with the Greek hierarchy.

By itself his work on *Revelation* is confusing and unimpressive, and the attempt to interpret history, notably contemporary history, follows a familiar and unconvincing line. It is possible that Makrakis' significance would appear in a broader view of his thought than is afforded by this one volume. Professor Alexander would render a service to his readers by writing some day a more comprehensive description of Makrakis' life and opinions.

R. P. CASEY

The Photian Schism: History and Legend. By FRANCIS DVORNIK. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1948. XIV, 504 pp.

In recent years there has been a greatly increased understanding of Byzantine life and thought that involves often an almost complete alteration of the traditional ideas held in the West. This volume is a part of the new movement. By a careful analysis of the documents concerned with the dispute between Photius, Ignatius, and the various Popes, the author, a Roman Catholic scholar of great learning, disposes of nearly the entire story of the opposition between Photius and the various Popes. He not only contradicts the accepted Western view of Photius but also traces the growth of the Photian legend throughout the Middle Ages and shows that Western opposition to Photius really took shape long after the detailed course of events had been forgotten.

The author lays great stress upon the existence in Byzantium of two ecclesiastical and political parties, a rigoristic party to which Ignatius belonged, and a more moderate and tolerant group of which Photius made himself the head. These parties continued for centuries and were, perhaps, in some way a continuation of the Circus Parties, the Blues and the Greens, of earlier centuries.

Yet there is one further point to be investigated before we can secure an adequate picture of the events of these centuries, and that is the concept of the Empire. Before the division of the Roman Empire between the East and the West, and while its capital was still at Rome, there was little hesitation in acknowledging the Bishop of Rome as the ecclesiastic of highest rank. As the Roman and Greek world grew apart politically as well as intellectually and the Frankish world grew in influence and sought to re-establish a Western Empire, there was always the question in the mind of the leaders as to the ideal scope of the power of both Emperor and Pope. Byzantine Emperors recognized and withdrew recognition from Western Emperors in accordance with the needs of the moment. Likewise, there was similar dissension in the understanding of the positions of the Pope and the Emperor, depending upon the military and political situation in both East and West. There could be disagreements, but so long as the fiction remained that there was one Empire and one Church in the Christian world, it was impossible for a long-continued break.

Again and again the author of this book makes us feel that this consideration played an important role in the fatal ninth century. The struggle for Bulgaria and its Christianity raised so many points of conflict, which were cleverly used by the Bulgarian ruler Boris, that neither the East nor the West were prepared to maintain a logical position on the old theoretical ideas. Yet neither side was willing to accept the new position of separation. Just as increasing knowledge throws the Byzantine situation into a clearer perspective, so a more careful analysis of the ideas involved will show the intellectual development which ultimately paved the way for the complete separation of the two halves of the Christian world, politically and religiously. We can only hope that the author and the other scholars of this newer and deeper school of research will throw

more light upon this complicated problem, which has far too often been dismissed with cursory judgment and partisan prejudice.

C. A. M.

Emperor Frederick II. By David G. Einstein. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. 427 pp. $4.50.

This book suffers fatally from its premature birth: it lacks that broad knowledge of the Middle Ages which is essential to an understanding of the career of the great Hohenstaufen. The very first sentence jolts the reader with the statement that Frederick II was "the last of the Holy Roman Emperors." Alas for Charles V, Voltaire, and Napoleon. Even more distressing assertions follow: "The right of the Pope to rule the State . . . had long been accepted by the people" (p. 217); "the marriage of a monarch in the medieval age required the assent and approval of the Holy Father" (p. 178); from the time of Robert Guiscard "the Sicilian court, like that of Greece, had bathed in Saracenic splendor" (p. 204); "the attempt to find learning outside of the Holy Writ was sacrilegious in the eyes of the Church" (p. 205). With observations of this sort it is not surprising to be told that perhaps Frederick's "greatest contribution lay in his recognition of the fact that education of the masses is a State duty" (p. 206), or that "for the first time in the history of Europe, the subjects of philosophy and the natural sciences" were taught at the University of Naples (p. 183).

The spelling of the names of places and persons is almost equally disconcerting (*see* page references in the index): Haguenau (Hagenau), Acquiliea (Aquileia), Viterbero (Viterbo), Corte Nueva (Cortenuova), Toronto (Taranto), Coloma (Colonna); and Walter of Ocra emerges as Walter of Caera (p. 388). The "Selected Bibliography" (p. 421) offers even greater surprises. Gee and Hardy's well-known *Documents Illustrative of English Church History* comes out as Hardy and Gree, "Documents Illustrative of Church History," Maurice De Wulf as Maurice Wuef, and James Bryce as James Byrce; and so on. No mention is made of the indispensable *Historia Diplomatica,* edited by Huillard-Bréholles, of Ernst Kantorowicz's *Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite* (2 vols., 1927, 1931), or even of the English translation, published in 1931, of his vol. I, the master biography of Frederick. Karl Hampe's writings are not referred to—not even his *Kaiser Friedrich II in der Auffassung der Nachwelt* (1925). And no mention is made of Gertrude Slaughter's *The Amazing Frederic* (1937)—the best popular biography of the emperor in English—although space is found, in the "Selected Bibliography," for three source books commonly used in college freshman history classes. (Two of the three are inaccurately cited.)

G. C. Sellery

Henry VIII and the Reformation. By H. Maynard Smith, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. xv, 480 pp. $8.50.

This volume is a companion to the author's *Pre-Reformation England,* published ten years earlier. Canon Smith devotes Part I of the present work to "the

political Reformation," Part II to "the religious Reformation." This arrangement involves chronological difficulties and suggests the false, though not uncommon, assumption that, in England, the political aspect of the Reformation was prior to, or the cause of, the religious movement that produced the English Bible, the Prayer Book, and the spirit of the Marian martyrs. The author does not, indeed, affirm this view, and the information he provides is actually opposed to it. It is, perhaps, natural to report the external aspects of a revolution first, but this method ought not to be allowed to carry a historian into such a chronological inversion as the treatment of Cromwell before Tyndale or delaying an account of the White Horse Tavern enthusiasts for reform, who were significantly active (1518-26) until after Henry VIII has been laid to rest.

"Romantic historians," says Dr. Smith, have exaggerated the importance of these Cambridge gospellers; yet he points out that two of them became archbishops, seven of them bishops, and eight of them martyrs. The suggestion that Wolsey was in large measure responsible for the English Reformation, and the statement that Anne Boleyn precipitated the schism, bear a superficial element of truth. It would have been better to begin with a thoughtful assessment of the religious situation and vital religious forces in the first twenty years of Henry's reign. An adequate treatment of such data would not support the inference that many will draw from this book, namely that the Reformation was mainly a series of adjustments made by an embarrassed and somewhat reckless king, affecting the structure of the church and attended by certain religious phenomena.

I do not think that Dr. Smith wishes to give this impression. He furnishes, in Part II, a sincere and interesting account of what really happened in church affairs. His characterizations of persons are in general vivid and accurate. He is not a moralizing historian, and is little inclined either to admiration or to condemnation. His ecclesiastical viewpoint is best discernible in the fact that more often than not the witticisms are at the expense of the Protestantizers. That "Tyndale knew no more of prelates than a soap-box orator in Hyde Park knows of dukes" is entertaining but misleading. Years before he wrote about prelates, Tyndale knew Tunstal at least well enough. On the whole, however, Tyndale is not unjustly judged, and the treatment of Cranmer is admirable.

My complaints notwithstanding, I am happy to commend the work as a scholarly and valuable one. It is based upon extensive and independent research, and many of its pages offer revealing fragments of information not discoverable in other modern works. It will prove very helpful to teachers and students. Indexes, manufacture and proof reading are excellent. On page 424, *"Patrick's Pleas"* should be *"Patrick's Places."*

J. T. M.

Literature and Theology in Colonial New England. By KENNETH B. MURDOCK. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949. xi, 235 pp. $4.10.

Mr. Murdock here surveys the literary art of the seventeenth century American Puritans in a way which reveals his mastery of the field and his sober critical

judgment. He takes time and space to discuss the superior art of the English Puritans who served as models for their colonial contemporaries, and proves that, even though the Americans were relatively crude artists, they followed their distinguished English brethren in cultivating "the plain style." The American writers were noteworthy for several reasons: (1) they wrote extremely "plainly" because they were consciously writing for a non-literary public; (2) they wrote more of public, congregational, and community matters, than the English Puritans, who were forced into seclusion and privacy; (3) they elaborated the theology of their migration into the wilderness; (4) they disdained the life of the senses even more than did the English Puritans, and consciously wrote not about what they felt, but what they felt they ought to feel; their literary art, in other words, was devoted to the theological arts of edification, confession, and philosophy of history. Not the least attractive feature of this little volume of lectures is the generous sprinkling of excellently chosen quotations.

The chief works that are discussed are: William Bradford's *History of Plymouth Plantation,* Edward Johnson's *The Wonder-Working Providence of Sion's Saviour in New England,* Nathaniel Morton's *New England's Memorial,* Increase Mather's *History of King Philip's War;* the diaries of Michael Wigglesworth, Samuel Sewall, and Cotton Mather; the autobiographies of Thomas Shepard; the biographies in Cotton Mather's *Magnalia Christi Americana,* John Morton's life of John Cotton, and Increase Mather's life of his father, Richard Mather; the poetry of Joseph Tompson, Michael Wigglesworth, Anne Bradstreet, and Edward Taylor.

The last chapter, entitled "The Puritan Legacy," is an attempt to trace the diverse ways in which Puritan influence appears in the later literature of New England. One striking observation that emerges from this last chapter is the fact that though Puritan literary art of the seventeenth century was almost wholly dominated by theology, this art exercised its power over later generations long after the theology had been repudiated.

H. W. S.

Alfred Loisy. Der Vater des katholischen Modernismus. By Friedrich Heiler. Munich: J. & S. Federmann Verlag, 1947. 252 pp. DM 12.

Heiler tells us that he originally started to write an obituary notice on Loisy for *Eine Heilige Kirche,* but after working through a considerable amount of material he found that *"statt eines Nachrufs eine Biographie entstanden ist"* (p. 7). The book is certainly more than a biography, however, and it is distinguished by the way in which it combines the story of Loisy's life and struggle with the Church with a solid account and criticism of his numerous writings. Of particular importance are the following three parts of the book: (1) The brief indication of Loisy's influence on Heiler's own thought (p. 9); (2) The section (15, pp. 169 ff.) deals with Loisy's theory of religion; (3) The *Nachwort* (pp. 230 ff.) in which Heiler discusses the book of Maude Petre on Loisy which appeared in England in 1944. This little book, as Heiler notes, came to his hand too late to

be incorporated into the main body of the text. He finds himself largely in agreement with Miss Petre's interpretation except on two heads. First, Heiler would stress more sharply the difference between the immanence standpoint of Loisy's *Humanitätsreligion* and the strain of transcendence characteristic of his later *Religion des Geistes*. Secondly, Heiler differs from Miss Petre on the subject of Loisy's relation to von Hügel. He believes that she overemphasizes the divergence in viewpoint between them, and that she is more harsh in her judgment on von Hügel, the man, than is warranted.

The book is a noteworthy addition to the literature concerning Loisy in particular and the Modernist movement in general.

JOHN E. SMITH

Power for Action: An Introduction to Christian Ethics. By WILLIAM A. SPURRIER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. xii, 200 pp. $2.50.

The writer of this little book had the laudable purpose of providing an introduction to Christian ethics in simple, non-technical language. He tries to steer a middle course between a superficial "popular" treatment and a technical theological treatise. He is aiming primarily at college students, but he has not written a textbook. The book is a bit too slangy and informal for that, but it should prove useful and thought-provoking for individual reading and for discussion in small groups.

The position adopted is that of a moderate "neo-orthodoxy" rather than the liberalism of a short generation ago. Christian ethics is presented as integrally related to the Christian faith. It is not a system of "do's and don'ts," resting upon the authority of the Bible or of Christ. It consists of the ethical implications or consequences of Christian teaching about the nature of God and man. Its essential principles are love and righteousness. We should love God because God has loved us, and we should love our neighbor because he too is a child of God. Love is more a matter of attitude than of law or of abstract principles, and its demands are so searching that its fulfillment requires a transformation of human nature. We fail to love our neighbor as ourselves because we are self-centered. If we try to escape from this predicament by our own efforts we fall into the sin of pride. There is no escape except by surrendering our self-sufficiency and acknowledging our absolute dependence upon God. Such surrender does not miraculously and immediately transform selfish men into selfless saints, but it does make possible a relative freedom from the sense of guilt and from impulses, habits, and man-made loyalties. This freedom carries with it a sense of power leading to a higher level of moral action. Thus Christian ethics results in the paradox that self-forgetfulness makes possible "the most dynamic happiness and the greatest self-fulfillment."

These principles are applied by the writer to a wide range of practical problems and areas, both social and personal. It is in these sections that the weaknesses of the book come out most clearly. The writer's attempt to use the language of undergraduates results in an impression of superficiality. The discus-

sion of such problems as war, the economic order, and race relations is pretty thin and inconclusive. Perhaps it is inevitable that so brief a book should create this impression, but in the opinion of this reviewer, it might have been avoided or at least mitigated by more careful writing, particularly in the sections mentioned.

JOHN M. MOORE

The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander. By JOHN W. MCCARTHY. New York: King's Crown Press, 1949. 111 pp. $2.50.

Dr. McCarthy's doctoral work grew out of an attempt to find a contemporary thinker "who would do justice to religion, art and morality within the framework of our scientific enterprise" (p. 1). Unlike his predecessors, who discuss some particular topic, McCarthy intends to appraise the sum total of Alexander's philosophizing. Out of the many contributions made by Alexander, only those are dealt with which bring all sorts of human experience into a coherent system.

McCarthy puts the main emphasis on the unifying thoughts of Alexander's metaphysics, ethics, esthetics, religion, and, omits or mentions in a very perfunctory way all other ideas which are not pertinent to his total "vision" of the world. Naturalism is for McCarthy the proper name for Alexander's meditations, for his reasoning, and the results arrived at. If naturalism stands for the notion that the universe is self-existing and self-explanatory, for the assumption of the unity of experience against all kinds of divisions (such as the realm of phenomena and the realm of noumena, the natural and the supernatural, mind and body), then Alexander's philosophy is an illustration of naturalism. But naturalism also stands for reliance on the scientific method, for the avoidance of vacuous concepts devoid of objective references. By no stretch of imagination can we square Alexander's metaphysics (represented in his Gifford Lectures, which appeared in the book *Space, Time, and Deity*) with this meaning of naturalism or realism. McCarthy does it, but in a very "unscientific" way, and his conclusions are not convincing. Among many proofs for the naturalistic basis of Alexander's metaphysics, he mentions the admiration for Spinoza, the treatment of all forms of experience as equal kinds, the ontological approach, the extension of values to lower levels of existence, the concept of a purposive nature. If we add Alexander's metaphorical and fanciful exposition of "Space" and "Time" (e.g., the mind is a form of Time; Space-Time breaking into various finites; Time as the creative force, etc.), we must be taken by surprise reading McCarthy's sentence: "I trust that this presentation has brought out the realism or naturalism which pervades the philosophy of Alexander" (p. 24). In the same chapter he tells us that "Alexander's method is scientific and continues with a quotation from *Space, Time, and Deity* (I, 172): "The hypothesis is that the simplest being is Space-Time itself, and that material things are but modes of this one simple being, finite complexes of Space-Time or motion,

dowered with qualities which are familiar to us in sensible experience. That hypothesis must justify itself in the sequel by its metaphysical success." But a scientific hypothesis must do more than justify itself by its "metaphysical success." It must justify itself by its empirical success, that is, it must allow of verifiable deductions.

In spite of great shortcomings, McCarthy's book is not without value. It keeps our interest alive in Samuel Alexander (1859-1937), who for many years taught at Manchester, England. Considering the difficult aim of the work to unify all thoughts of Alexander, the critic is aware of the impediments to an adequate fulfillment of such a broad task. The best chapter of the book is that on "Religion." Here McCarthy succeeds in presenting a rich content in a precise and coherent form.

SAMUEL L. HART

The Communication of Ideas. Edited with introduction and conclusion by LYMAN BRYSON. New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, distributed by Harper Brothers, 1948. ix, 296 pp. $3.50.

The chief value of this particular group of addresses under the Religion and Civilization Series given at Jewish Theological Seminary, is that at least half of them succeed in breaking through the old futile business of methods and techniques that have dogged communications studies, with an almost enthusiastic conviction that communications is not an end in itself but a means for saying what is important to say. The other half of the addresses are involved, as of old, with dissecting the "process" of communications in midair with an inevitable sludge of dreariness and unreality.

The half who try to think deeply about communication—each of them dealing with it in his own field—arrive at rather basic conclusions. Margaret Mead's thesis is that the problem of communications with special reference to intercultural exchange is not really a problem of communications primarily, but one that originates in the prior problem of differing ideas and goals. Lyman Bryson, the editor, with a marked although clumsy awareness, arrives at the real crux of the matter: how to turn to good purposes the mass techniques already perfected. Whitney Oates, outlining the acute classic position on communications, takes the same stand, emphasizing content and truth rather than methods. Siepman, of the radio field, in the same vein lashes at the radio industry for its indifference to content, and thus its casual indulgence of the survival of the sickest.

Paul Lazarsfeld, in what I think is the most penetrating chapter in the book, sets down the real snags: the menace of the potential and ubiquitous power in mass communications; the possibility of the continuing assault of the media on vast audiences that may lead to the unconditional surrender of critical faculties and an unthinking conformity; and the possibility of a deterioration of taste and popular cultural standards. But he thinks that the panic concerning the power of communications does not stem from the

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strength and power inherent to mass communications, but comes from the general insecurity of the people themselves, whose values to begin with are too tenuous to hold up under pressure. Before such weak discrimination, propaganda is quite rightly a threat—but the trouble is not with the propaganda. With his analysis techniques of mass reception, Lazarsfeld is prepared to say how much each of the above mentioned problems should be feared, how to deal with them, and, moreover, suggests how mass communications could be used constructively for a crusade and as an agent for creative propaganda to reinforce tenuous values. What the content of this propaganda or gospel might be, he does not say, nor do any of the other authors, but there is a sincere acknowledgement of a need for something to say in the human situation that is adequate and relevant. Incidentally, there is no reference to religion.

MARYAT LEE

The Recovery of Culture. By HENRY BAILEY STEVENS. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949. xvii, 247 pp.

This is a vegetarian tract, argued with bits of prehistory—sprinklings of facts overwhelmed by made-to-order theories; with pieces of mythology and folklore—uncritically accepted interpretations from Frazer being well to the fore; with strangely rewritten passages from here and there in the history of religion; with references hither and yon in the history of philosophy and literature, presented solely from the writer's own peculiar angle; with selections from agricultural statistics; with recurrent excursions in purely personal "philology"; and with perfervid proselytising.

One primary contention equals the false syllogism: higher apes are frugivore; Man evolved from higher apes; Man therefore should be frugivore. Similarly, Man should communicate only with the thirty-two elements of speech plus emotional vocalizations, used by the higher apes, about which Dr. Stevens sounds almost nostalgic; and he should *not* write books.

Dr. Stevens sounds in his prelude a triumphant fanfare: "Primitive agriculture was the powerhouse which, according to anthropologists [unnamed] first turned the wheels of religion and art" (p. xv). This proves to be an *ad lib.* secondary derivation from Dr. Menghin's proposal: "even primordial stages of plant cultivation may have been carried on in the protolithic [Dr. Menghin's personal term for lower or middle palaeolithic] handaxe culture." In the twelve years since this remark was published it has been politely left almost wholly alone. But in Dr. Stevens' resuscitation, it grows to the proposal that Man "was actually planting seeds" 500,000 years ago. Elsewhere these appear to have been fruit-tree seeds (Dr. Stevens is a professional orchardist), primarily, and almost universally, apples. *Genesis* made a mistake in the story that eating an apple—Dr. Stevens takes this literally—caused the Expulsion; and nothing could be more erroneous than the tale of Paris and the apple of discord.

Dr. Stevens' exposition of this, to him basic point, summarizes: handaxes date from the lower palaeolithic period; handaxes can be used effectively for digging the ground and cutting trees; therefore, arboriculture dates from the lower palaeolithic; continuing—agriculture in earlier historic times was associated with religious practices; therefore religion begins in the lower palaeolithic period with aboriculture; further—early art and religion are connected; therefore art was initiated by frugivores. Thus Dr. Stevens drapes a veil over the fact that the earliest known art—the engraving, carving, and magnificent animal painting of the Aurignacian and Magdalenian cultures—is, in its associations, emphatically carnivorous. Nowhere does Dr. Stevens mention that hominids already had omnivore dentures.

This summary is not a travesty, nor is the book meant as a caricature. It goes on and on, page after perverted page, fact, ideas, and logic turned inside out and upside down to fit the special pleading. The "philological" influence of the apple extends from the wah-wah song of the apes to Avalokiteśvara.

To have expended more than 250 octavo pages of type and paper in this fashion is more than regrettable at a time when valuable work in cultural history is lacking publication facilities. But the most unfortunate result of such misbegotten essays is that they encourage scholars in the humanities who are still constricted by the nineteenth-century pseudo-scientific factual descriptive method to continue evading efforts to think. For such irresponsible subjectivism, let loose with a semblance of scholarly range of reference, provides a straw-man whom the pseudo-scientists can easily destroy, creating, for themselves at least, the illusion that they are thereby disqualifying legitimate and valuable interpretation.

PHYLLIS ACKERMAN

Unknown Germany: An Inner Chronicle of the First World War. By HANNA HAFKESBRINK. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. xiv, $2.50.

Letters, diaries, and excerpts from autobiographies of Germans of the First World War period, most of them written by soldiers and students, make up this unusual anthology. By means of them Miss Hanna Hafkesbrink tries to prove that there have always been "good Germans" too; that there have always been Germans opposed to war and militarism; and that, after 1918, the majority of them looked upon peace not merely as a chance to rest, but as a challenge to this cause.

Miss Hafkesbrink is apparently torn between conflicting interpretations of the German national character. There are gruesome facts, facts not to deny, the worst ones of European history. There is the spirit of the Old Wehrmacht, a part of the foundation of the German state; at times it has almost *been* the state; its record in Germany is completely anti-democratic, authoritarian. On the other hand, Miss Hafkesbrink has a sharp memory of a profoundly human Germany, consisting of millions of individuals with philosophies varying from Christian and idealist to socialist.

These moving letters, collected by relatives, frequently after the author had fallen in battle, were selected from volumes of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish letters, diaries of wives, widows, and mothers, and autobiographical records. This reviewer, who never believed in the collective guilt of a nation, can only welcome the presentation of such material. It reminds him that his own experiences—thirty years ago—could not be totally wrong.

On the other hand, an anthology of even the most idealistic writing of Germans cannot solve the riddle of a certain mentality which seems to be inherent in them. It was not created by the Fuehrer; it must have existed as early as the Middle Ages, when other nations, unwilling to wage war, hired German soldiers to do the job for them. During my trip to Germany last summer, I met the finest kind of youth everywhere between the Isar and the Elbe. But many of the best Germans told me that democracy in their country is again so shallow that the rise of any neo-fascist parties would kill it. Therefore, what is the quintessence of Miss Hafkesbrink's book? Only this, that she was right in making available to the public all information which may restore the balance of our judgment; she did her duty; this is no time to rest on prejudices. But letters and diaries of exceptional individuals are no assurance whatsoever that the Germans will become better simply because we are trying to be just.

OTTO ZOFF

Doctors of Infamy: The Story of the Nazi Medical Crimes. By ALEXANDER MITSCHERLICH, M.D. and FRED MIELKE. New York: Henry Schuman, 1949. xxxix, 172 pp. $3.00.

The revelations contained in this book must be especially shocking to a student of the history of religion, who is familiar with the close connection of the art of healing with religious cults down through the ages. In an introductory statement, Dr. Andrew C. Ivy, Medical Scientific Consultant to the Prosecution at Nuremberg, speaks of the difficulty American medical men had in believing the rumors of medical atrocities in the concentration camps. He says,

> We knew that some churchmen had openly revolted against Hitler; and since we had heard of no protests from the medical profession, we had assumed that the sacred aspects of medicine and its ethics would certainly remain inviolate. . . . Now it appears evident to me that this "witches' sabbath" of medical crime was only the logical end result of the mythology of racial inequality and of the gradual but finally complete encroachment on the ethics and freedom of medicine by the Nazis. . . . And this process, so far as I know, went unopposed by the German medical profession (pp. x f.).

Thus we see that the degradation of the German medical profession was the product, not of a science divorced from religion, but of a once free science subjected to a vicious pagan religion of "blood and soil."

M.B.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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